Sunday, March 21, 2010

Gary Gorton vs. Michael Lewis


I earlier blogged about Yale economist Gary Gorton's model of the financial crisis here. He put several papers into a new book, Slapped in the Face by the Invisible Hand, which is a quite helpful distillation of several of his papers. Unfortunately, while the book has hardly any math, it still reads pretty much like an academic paper, and there are no conspicuous villains, no gobsmackingly stupid errors. So, it will never be very satisfying to most people, who like to think it was all hubris, a bad formula, greed, meanness, or lack of sufficient regulation.

The basic idea is that the repo market had developed as an independent source of funds, and when some AAA rated mortgaged backed securities started to fall in price, this tainted all AAA securities, especially asset backed paper. AAA securities have a 0.01% default rate, so from a bayesian perspective, when you see a default here the probability is not that one was very unfortunate, but rather, the rating was wrong. Perhaps all ratings are wrong?! Everyone was scrambling to understand how much these previously innocuous securities were worth and found them insanely complicated, so people naturally assumed the root cause could be anything related to the housing-related securities: debt, derivatives, rated securities, complexity, etc. Everything was painted by the same brush, as when one cow tainted with e. coli causes a wholesale destruction of all beef products sold in the US, because one can't be sure. A run on the repo market was a classic bank run, causing the banking system to be insolvent, and lending to sharply contract.

His main evidence that this was a system-wide crisis was that securities backed by autos, credit cards, student loans, and financial companies of varied focus all declined, even though default rates in these other classes were not changing much. A financial crisis is when all finance becomes suspect, created a self-fulling prophesy because the system is always insolvent if there is no confidence in the system. This was best highlighted by Felix Salmon's article blaming the crisis on a specific mathematical formula, copulas, as if this could underlie any portfolio (portfolios invariably are designed with a focus on correlations, and copulas are a way to do this for debt securities).

It's very interesting to think of financial crises, and recessions they cause, this way, as overreactions caused by people not being able to suss out the essence of a crisis in real time. Gorton notes crises occurred regularly in the US (1819, 1837, 1860, 73, 84, 90, 93, 1907, 1914, 1931-33), and every time, people are befuddled. When a a drastic change occurs, such as the change from Free Banking era (1837-62) to the National Banking era, or the creation of the Federal Reserve, after about 10 years they think they have eliminated business cycles. They put in new institutions, but because they don't fully understand the old institution, they fail in totally unappreciated new ways. For example, the Fed contracted the money supply dramatically from 1931-33, something they were oblivious to (interest rates were low, so they thought monetary policy was 'easy'), which Friedman and Schwartz argue turned a recession into a depression.

Gorton notes that fixes are perhaps futile. Indeed, he has some recommendations, one that the government insure 'approved AAA' paper, to help reduce the risk of a panic, but given their role in the reduction of credit underwriting standards (documented on page 66), it is then likely they would have made the essential mistake worse, because one thing government does not do well is admit mistakes, because they don't have to (unfortunately, no government agency has gone bankrupt).

I would suggest that the US financial system was also insolvent in 1975,1981,1990, and that if you had to mark their books to market, (indeed we had new accounting, FAS 157 that tried to apply market prices to accounting during the crisis), this would basically cause massive dislocations. Why not increase bank capital rates from 4-8%, to 20+%? I don't see a consistent risk premium in financial markets, so the cost is rather low. That is, the market does not require a 6% return premium to bank equity, so one does not need that kind of leveraged return.

This book is not a definitive statement on the crisis, but it highlights a necessary and sufficient condition for a financial crisis. As to what caused the initial problem, Gorton highlights housing price declines, noting that the subprime Asset Backed securities assumed prices could only rise or stay flat. As a rule, any collateral should be assumed to have the same expected return, say a couple percent above the risk free rate. Further, its future volatility should assume that the historical moves up reveal potential moves downward (e.g., the 50% upturn suggests a 50% downturn is highly probable). The junk bonds at the center of the 1990 financial crisis, the high tech financing in the 2001 crisis, the lending to oil states in the 1980s, were all associated with excessive leverage based on the idea that collateral would either be stable or rise. It's a common mistake, made in different asset classes each time. As my old mentor Kevin Blakely has said, the problem of excessive leverage keeps showing up with different names: Highly Levered Transactions (HLTs), equity financing (loans backed by firm 'equity'), Alt-A mortgage-backed securities.

Alas, most people will find Gorton a bit too dry, too many references, too much math (there are a handful of algebraic equations). Michael Lewis, in contrast, takes the Gladwellian approach to big problems, which is always well received. Indeed, I have seen him an on TV with several different interviewers discussing his latest book, The Big Short [I expect Russ Roberts at econtalk to interview him and totally agree, notwithstanding the 5 other authors with orthogonal diagnoses he also totally agreed with]. Lewis is considered an expert because he worked on Wall street for 2 years and wrote Liar's Poker, an insider's view of the bluster of rich young men. As anyone who has worked in an industry for a couple decades knows, after only 2 years in the business, the impressions of a kid right out of college, no matter how smart and eloquent the sojourner, are invariably quite naive. Indeed, Lewis's main thesis in Liar's Poker remains a theme in his latest book, the Big Short: finance is mainly an irrelevant Rube's Goldberg device for paying greedy, selfish people too much money. He notes that banks actually were shorting some products they were promoting, as if there was a big conspiracy, ignoring the fact that a market requires sellers, and increasing liquidity is a good thing because if every asset must be held to maturity, costs of financing would be much higher, etc. Further, large financial institutions have many departments, and the fact they have different opinions is about as strange as the fact that America is full of people who disagree on whether tax rates are too high. Ultimately Lewis blames everyone, but especially greedy bankers, and so in a banal sense he is correct.

But Lewis will most assuredly sell more books than Gorton, part of the reason these crises are endogenous.

Friday, March 19, 2010

Crisis and Leviathan

A list of all the new boards, bureaucracies, commissions, and programs created in H.R. 3962, Speaker Pelosi's 1018 page health care bill.

I think that government is necessary for a well-ordered society. What really bothers me, is that when they create an policy or department, it never dies, so we have sugar quotas, agricultural subsidies, NASA doing global climate change research. It's estimated to be about 50k new employees, 111 new groups.

1. Retiree Reserve Trust Fund (Section 111(d), p. 61)
2. Grant program for wellness programs to small employers (Section 112, p. 62)
3. Grant program for State health access programs (Section 114, p. 72)
4. Program of administrative simplification (Section 115, p. 76)
5. Health Benefits Advisory Committee (Section 223, p. 111)
6. Health Choices Administration (Section 241, p. 131)
7. Qualified Health Benefits Plan Ombudsman (Section 244, p. 138)
8. Health Insurance Exchange (Section 201, p. 155)
9. Program for technical assistance to employees of small businesses buying Exchange coverage (Section 305(h), p. 191)
10. Mechanism for insurance risk pooling to be established by Health Choices Commissioner (Section 306(b), p. 194)
11. Health Insurance Exchange Trust Fund (Section 307, p. 195)
12. State-based Health Insurance Exchanges (Section 308, p. 197)
13. Grant program for health insurance cooperatives (Section 310, p. 206)
14. Public Health Insurance Option (Section 321, p. 211)
15. Ombudsman for Public Health Insurance Option (Section 321(d), p. 213)
16. Account for receipts and disbursements for Public Health Insurance Option(Section 322(b), p. 215)
17. Telehealth Advisory Committee (Section 1191 (b), p. 589)
18. Demonstration program providing reimbursement for culturally and linguistically appropriate services(Section 1222, p. 617)
19. Demonstration program for shared decision making using patient decision aids (Section 1236, p. 648)
20. Accountable Care Organization pilot program under Medicare (Section 1301, p. 653)
21. Independent patient-centered medical home pilot program under Medicare (Section 1302, p. 672)
22. Community-based medical home pilot program under Medicare (Section 1302(d), p. 681)
23. Independence at home demonstration program (Sect Health Insurance Option(Section 322(b), p. 215)
17. Telehealth Advisory Committee (Section 1191 (b), p. 589)
18. Demonstration program providing reimbursement for culturally and linguistically appropriate services (Section 1222, p. 617)
19. Demonstration program for shared decision making using patient decision aids (Section 1236, p. 648)
20. Accountable Care Organization pilot program under Medicare (Section 1301, p. 653)
21. Independent patient-centered medical home pilot program under Medicare (Section 1302, p. 672)
22. Community-based medical home pilot program under Medicare (Section 1302(d), p. 681)
23. Independence at home demonstration program (Section 1312, p. 718)
24. Center for Comparative Effectiveness Research (Section 1401(a), p. 734)
25. Comparative Effectiveness Research Commission (Section 1401(a), p. 738)
26. Patient ombudsman for comparative effectiveness research (Section 1401(a), p. 753)
27. Quality assurance and performance improvement program for skilled nursing facilities (Section 1412(b)(1), p. 784)
28. Quality assurance and performance improvement program for nursing facilities (Section 1412 (b)(2), p. 786)
29. Special focus facility program for skilled nursing facilities (Section 1413(a)(3), p. 796)
30. Special focus facility program for nursing facilities (Section 1413(b)(3), p. 804)
31. National independent monitor pilot program for skilled nursing facilities and nursing facilities (Section 1422, p. 859)
32. Demonstration program for approved teaching health centers with respect to Medicare GME (Section 1502(d), p. 933)
33. Pilot program to develop anti-fraud compliance systems for Medicare providers (Section 1635, p. 978)
34. Special Inspector General for the Health Insurance Exchange (Section 1647, p. 1000)
35. Medical home pilot program under Medicaid (Section 1722, p. 1058)
36. Accountable Care Organization pilot program under Medicaid (Section 1730A, p. 1073)
37. Nursing facility supplemental payment program (Section 1745, p. 1106)
38. Demo program for Medicaid coverage to stabilize emergency medical conditions in institutions for mental diseases (Section 1787, p. 1149)
39. Comparative Effectiveness Research Trust Fund (Section 1802, p. 1162)
40. Identifiable office or program within CMS to provide for improved coordination between Medicare and Medicaid in the case of dual eligibility (Section 1905, p. 1191)
41. Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (Section 1907, p. 1198)
42. Public Health Investment Fund (Section 2002, p. 1214)
43. Scholarships for service in health professional needs areas (Section 2211, p. 1224)
44. Program for training medical residents in community-based settings (Section 2214, p. 1236)
45. Grant program for training in dentistry programs (Section 2215, p. 1240)
46. Public Health Workforce Corps (Section 2231, p. 1253)
47. Public health workforce scholarship program (Section 2231, p. 1254)
48. Public health workforce loan forgiveness program (Section 2231, p. 1258)
49. Grant program for innovations in interdisciplinary care (Section 2252, p. 1272)
50. Advisory Committee on Health Workforce Evaluation and Assessment (Section 2261, p. 1275)
51. Prevention and Wellness Trust (Section 2301, p. 1286)
52. Clinical Prevention Stakeholders Board (Section 2301, p. 1295)
53. Community Prevention Stakeholders Board (Section 2301, p. 1301)
54. Grant program for community prevention and wellness research (Section 2301, p. 1305)
55. Grant program for research and demonstration projects related to wellness incentives (Section 2301, p. 1305)
56. Grant program for community prevention and wellness services (Section 2301, p. 1308)
57. Grant program for public health infrastructure (Section 2301, p. 1313)
58. Center for Quality Improvement (Section 2401, p. 1322)
59. Assistant Secretary for Health Information (Section 2402, p. 1330)
60. Grant program to support the operation of school-based health clinics (Section 2511, p. 1352)
61. Grant program for nurse-managed health centers (Section 2512, p. 1361)
62. Grants for labor-management programs for nursing training (Section 2521, p. 1372)
63. Grant program for interdisciplinary mental and behavioral health training (Section 2522, p. 1382)
64. No Child Left Non-immunized Against Influenza demonstration grant program (Section 2524, p. 1391)
65. Healthy Teen Initiative grant program regarding teen pregnancy (Section 2526, p. 1398)
66. Grant program for interdisciplinary training, education, and services for individuals with autism (Section 2527(a), p. 1402)
67. University centers for excellence in developmental disabilities education (Section 2527(b), p. 1410)
68. Grant program to implement medication therapy management services (Section 2528, p. 1412)
69. Grant program to promote positive health behaviors in underserved communities (Section 2530, p. 1422)
70. Grant program for State alternative medical liability laws (Section 2531, p. 1431)
71. Grant program to develop infant mortality programs (Section 2532, p. 1433)
72. Grant program to prepare secondary school students for careers in health professions (Section 2533, p. 1437)
73. Grant program for community-based collaborative care (Section 2534, p. 1440)
74. Grant program for community-based overweight and obesity prevention (Section 2535, p. 1457)
75. Grant program for reducing the student-to-school nurse ratio in primary and secondary schools (Section 2536, p. 1462)
76. Demonstration project of grants to medical-legal partnerships (Section 2537, p. 1464)
77. Center for Emergency Care under the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (Section 2552, p. 1478)
78. Council for Emergency Care (Section 2552, p 1479)
79. Grant program to support demonstration programs that design and implement regionalized emergency care systems (Section 2553, p. 1480)
80. Grant program to assist veterans who wish to become emergency medical technicians upon discharge (Section 2554, p. 1487)
81. Interagency Pain Research Coordinating Committee (Section 2562, p. 1494)
82. National Medical Device Registry (Section 2571, p. 1501)
83. CLASS Independence Fund (Section 2581, p. 1597)
84. CLASS Independence Fund Board of Trustees (Section 2581, p. 1598)
85. CLASS Independence Advisory Council (Section 2581, p. 1602)
86. Health and Human Services Coordinating Committee on Women̢۪s Health (Section 2588, p. 1610)
87. National Woman's Health Information Center (Section 2588, p. 1611)
88. Centers for Disease Control Office of Woman's Health (Section 2588, p. 1614)
89. Agency for Health Care Research and Quality Office of Woman's Health and Gender-Based Research (Section 2588, p. 1617)
90. Health Resources and Services Administration Office of Woman's Health (Section 2588, p. 1618)
91. Food and Drug Administration Office of Woman's Health (Section 2588, p. 1621)
92. Personal Care Attendant Workforce Advisory Panel (Section 2589(a)(2), p. 1624)
93. Grant program for national health workforce online training (Section 2591, p. 1629)
94. Grant program to disseminate best practices on implementing health workforce investment programs (Section 2591, p. 1632)
95. Demonstration program for chronic shortages of health professionals (Section 3101, p. 1717)
96. Demonstration program for substance abuse counselor educational curricula (Section 3101, p. 1719)
97. Program of Indian community education on mental illness (Section 3101, p. 1722)
98. Intergovernmental Task Force on Indian environmental and nuclear hazards (Section 3101, p. 1754)
99. Office of Indian Man's Health (Section 3101, p. 1765)
100. Indian Health facilities appropriation advisory board (Section 3101, p. 1774)
101. Indian Health facilities needs assessment workgroup (Section 3101, p. 1775)
102. Indian Health Service tribal facilities joint venture demonstration projects (Section 3101, p. 1809)
103. Urban youth treatment center demonstration project (Section 3101, p. 1873)
104. Grants to Urban Indian Organizations for diabetes prevention (Section 3101, p. 1874)
105. Grants to Urban Indian Organizations for health IT adoption (Section 3101, p. 1877)
106. Mental health technician training program (Section 3101, p. 1898)
107. Indian youth telemental health demonstration project (Section 3101, p. 1909)
108. Program for treatment of child sexual abuse victims and perpetrators (Section 3101, p. 1925)
109. Program for treatment of domestic violence and sexual abuse (Section 3101, p. 1927)
110. Native American Health and Wellness Foundation (Section 3103, p. 1966)
111. Committee for the Establishment of the Native American Health and Wellness Foundation (Section 3103, p. 1968)

Thursday, March 18, 2010

Odds of a Perfect Bracket

2-63. That's if you don't know anything, where the chance of winning is 50% each game. To put this into perspective, that's about 250 times worse than winning back-to-back Powerball lotteries. Let's say you predict games correctly about 74% of the time, then the odds go up to a single Powerball.

In other words, don't be tempted by the lead that you will win $1MM if you get a perfect bracket. The time value of entering is well below the minimum wage.

[for non-US readers, I'm referring to the annual college basketball, single elimination basketball tournament with 64 teams]

Wednesday, March 17, 2010

Why?

There's the famous story about a philosophy course where the midterm exam question is simply 'Why?' While many students write for the entire hour, one kid simply writes, 'why not?', and gets an A. If this story is true, it highlights that philosophers are very good at talking nonsense and making it seem profound.

Consider comedian Louis CK's riff on 'Why?', and compare that to Richard Feynman's riff on 'Why?'. Both good, but in different ways.

Louis CK:


Richard Feynman:

Tuesday, March 16, 2010

Renaissance's Medallion Fund

A front page WSJ article on James Simon's Medallion fund, which has averaged a 45% return since its inception in 1988. Truly amazing. No one really knows how they do it, but it is rumored to employ some sort of quasi-market making, 'pairs-like' algorithm. That is, they trade a lot electronically, seeding the book and provididing liquidity (eg, limit orders to buy at the best bid or lower), and looking for abnormal movements with sympathetic stocks (eg, when IBM goes up, but Dell does not, sell IBM). This would explain why they are not really scalable ($10B Medallion has been closed to new investors for a long time).

But who knows. I hear they don't hire many economists, and instead prefer PhDs in Math, computer science, etc. This could be a slam on economists, in that we aren't as bright as these guys, or it could be our framework has been poisened by modern econometrics. However, it could be economist's are savvy enough to see the essence of the alpha, and so would be a bigger threat via leaving and starting a competitor, whereas the math PhDs are too focused on the little issues to grasp the bigger picture.

I did hear once (third hand) that in their legal dispute two ex-employees, the intellectual property at issue was quite trivial, which would suggest their alpha is merely being the fastest electronic market makers in the world. Someone has to be fastest. Considering the new co-CEOs are both computer scientists, that would make sense.

It is interesting that they started two other funds with a larger scale, hoping to make money off longer term strategies in futures and equities. These have not even outperformed the benchmarks, let alone displayed the amazing Medallion-type dominance. This highlights another reason to hide one's alpha, among the many (read Finding Alpha for more!). If your firm is in industry X, and makes money doing something very parochial within X, don't be too specific. This way, when you extend your brand, no one thinks twice about the plausibility that their new venture is totally different, and so customers are willing to give it a shot. It's possible Renaissance's alpha is in subtle price change correlations, a skill that would translate to other

Friday, March 12, 2010

Khan Academy

I came across a great website for brushing up on little ideas, like the the Laplace Transform, Ideal Gas equation; everything from Algebra to Evolution to the Geithner plan. Short snippets are done Camtasia-style, with no face, just talking over Khan Academy was founded by Salman Khan (Sal) with the goal of using technology to educate the world. Everything is free. An NPR interview with Khan is here. He worked for a hedge fund, and has technical degrees from Harvard and MIT.

I think in the long run, these are going to replace technical teaching. Khan is a very good teacher, and he's teaching things that aren't smushy like history or economics, so I think the subject is more like a commodity.

Wednesday, March 10, 2010

Hollywood for CFPA

A bunch of legendary comedians got together to make a sketch, where the punchline is: "establish a Consumer Financial Protection Agency". It's kinda a funny, but mostly because of the Darrell Hammond's imitation of Clinton making sexual innuendos, and Fred Armisen's impersonation of Barak Obama. It seems director Ron Howard was trying to find something to 'do good', so he chatted with the earnest and overeducated Elizabeth Warren, and decided consumer financial regulation was the kind of smart idea that would obviously work. After all, who's against consumer protection?

I am! This is the same government that goaded banks to lower standard to lend more to historically damaged communities, and then when those borrowers defaulted, blamed such lending on the banks. Avoiding the poor is redlining, targeting the poor is predatory, which means, whatever goes wrong can be blamed on the banks. Government always wants to have its cake and eat it too: low taxes & high spending, high growth and union-type work rules, banks lending more today and raising their capital.

The CFPA tries to do what most regulators try to do: improve efficiency, eliminate waste, consolidate regulations,simplify regulations, protect consumers, and protect jobs! It seems banks are greedy and basically uregulated, leading directly to the 2008 housing crisis. There are seven government bodies already regulating banks, highlighting how incredibly naive this proposal is. If there's a magic bullet for improving efficiency, etc., share it with existing regulators...unless you think that all the regulators have been captured by some interest group, which if true just means we are bringing in one more interest group to advocate why they should get a better deal.

More importantly, if your concern is about the irrational poor people easily duped by huckster bankers, lower prices and penalties on the poor doesn't help them, it enables them. Life has carrots and sticks, and one definition of a vice is that which generates bad outcomes in the long run. If you are constantly overdrafting your account, don't have enough money to make a 20% down payment on a property, you need better financial discipline. Helping the poor from being trapped by debt should try to minimize they amount of debt they have, say by increasing rather than lowering prices on credit cards. That would still allow emergency spending, but make people do it much less, which is a good thing.

It's like alcohol. You want to tax it sufficiently that making beer in your basement is not better (because then it will lead to illegal activity and lower quality control), but not so cheap that being a career drunk is easy (note that Cuba and the Soviet Union have very cheap booze prices--they want the populace perpetually inebriated).

One key to the housing bubble was the credit underwriting standards fell: no verification of income, no money down, etc. Basically, people got loans they could not afford. So this agency is intent on doubling down, assuming the problems before weren't because too many people had loans, but rather, bankers were greedy. Bankers want to maximize profits, but politicians want to pander via expropriation and cross-subsidizing. Which is better in the long run to an economy?

Politics is all about pandering egalitarianism, treating everyone the same regardless of their risk or behavior. As Joe Stiglitz knows, this leads to inefficiencies, because when you don't price according to cost (as reflected by higher default rates), you get more adverse selection in that the highest cost customers find the product most attractive, leading the best credits to leave, and ultimately rationing of those best credits. As Stiglitz 'proved', this is an inefficient equilibrium. But if government is running the show, such inefficiencies are all ok, because government merely adds more regulations, and so on. When the businesses fail, they almost always go out of business (unless they are really big); when government fails, it just increases its mandate's scope.

Monday, March 08, 2010

Kahneman on Two Happinesses

Danny Kahneman is the father of behavioral economics, and writes many interesting things. I think the implications of this school are vastly overstated, but he's a thoughtful, interesting, person.

He gave a talk at TED.org recently on experience vs. memory. His main idea is that there are two kinds of 'happiness', that which is experienced in a particular moment, and that which is remembered. The experiencing self that lives in the present, and is relevant when a doctor asks ‘does it hurt when I do this’? The remembering self is present, as when we ask ‘how was your vacation’? Happiness can be the memorizing self over time, or happiness when someone thinks about their life.

He mentions that these two aspects are very different, and lead to different objectives. The correlation between people’s experiential vs. remembered happiness is 0.5, which is why you can ask someone ‘are you happy now?’ and get no correlation with income over $60k, and ‘are you happy with your life?’, and get a significant correlation with income over $60k. It’s the difference between being happy in your life, and being happy about your life.

The difference between the two has been documented by by many experiments. For example, during colonoscopies in the 1990’s, back when the procedure was unambiguously painful, subjects would record their pain every minute. If you think of the pain going over a bell curve over time (rising and falling symmetricall), an experience that stopped at the top of the curve would be better than one that road the curve over its entire path. Yet the remembered experience that stopped at the top would be remembered worse, because the diminution of pain at the lower ending point would make the longer experience with more total pain seem ‘better'.

People choose mainly between memories of experiences vs. just experiences, and generally prefer the memorizing self vs. the experiencing self.

You can predictably manipulate the remembered experiences by manipulating endings. In the colonoscopy case, just remember to draw the procedure out longer, making it slightly less painful every minute, even though the procedure is functionally over. Go on a 1 week vacation instead of 2, because you will remember the experience it the same, as the memory of going to Greece is basically allocated a unit regardless of length once you go over a couple of days. This explains why people generally like having children, and find them adding to their life’s satisfaction, yet generally don’t like playing or interacting with their children.

Anyway, listen to the talk, it’s very interesting (though I just told you the main points).

Tuesday, March 02, 2010

Stiglitz's Freefall

The subtitle should be "why free market types are like religious fundamentalists", because he loves using the cute phrase 'market fundamentalism' the way MSNBC uses the phrase 'tea baggers'.

A nice thing about being a Nobel prize winner in economics is when you write books with the same policy recommendations, but use inconsistent arguments in each book, you still get the front table at Barnes and Noble. FreeFall makes the standard talking points you hear on AirAmerica, MoveOn.org, or Noam Chomsky:

1) every economy needs more regulation and higher taxes, especially on the rich
2) He, along with everyone who agrees with him that markets are irrational, predicted the 2008 financial crisis
3) the Community Reinvestment Act and similar government programs had absolutely nothing to do with the crisis.
4) the bubble was fueled by Greenspan's easy money from 2002-2007.

Why do we need more taxes and regulation? Well, according to Stiglitz, the rich are generally immune to incentives, probably parasitic, and generally monopolistic. Like Russian Kulaks, Jews in pre-War Germany, Indians in Uganda, the rich are impediments to growth & justice. Yet he also notes a large amount of financial innovation is to skirt taxes and regulations. I agree that many finacial innovations are focused on taxes and regulations, but that's only because these exogenous rules tend to create mutual gains from trade, and so are bad only if you think prices are wrong (ie, market participants are predictably wrong, or fail to capture externalities).

His proof that the CRA and other government housing initiative had nothing at all to do with the housing bubble, is proven thusly: AIG failed, and they didn't issue mortgages, just bought bonds and derivatives. QED. Further, subprime mortgages failed at rates similar to CRA related subprime mortgages. Yet, current law does not allow a bank to charge different prices based on race. To increase the amount of loans in historically underserved demographics--poor people--you have to lower the bar for all loans.

The old and seemingly irrational rules of thumb of having certain levels of wealth, credit score, validation of income, and downpayment, were diminished because of the fact that banks historically had low losses on mortgages, because there was little evidence of large year-over-year aggregate declines in real housing prices. Thus, for example, we went from requiring 20% down in the 1990's, to zero percent down in the bubble (now upped to 3.5% by the US's FHA). Indeed, Stiglitz himself wrote a white paper arguing that Fannie Mae's 2% capital requirement was more than adequate in 2002 (he estimated an expected loss on $1 Trillion by Fannie of only $2 Million--pre hindsight). Indeed, Fannie Mae was one of his examples of beneficial government policy in his 2002 book The Roaring Nineties. Fannie and Freddie have already cost the government $127B, and it's not done. That's 90 Nick Leesons and counting, but the nice thing about being an intellectual is you aren't accountable for for how policies that were aided and abbetted by your arguments actually worked, because if it fails, it wasn't implemented correctly (eg, Socialism didn't fail, rather, Soviet-style socialism failed).

His assertion that he called the subprime crisis is pretty weak. Look in vain for any strong statement by Stiglitz that underwriting for home lending was too easy prior to 2007, and you won't find it. He did reference an argument he made in 1992 that mortgage asset backed securities may be problematic, but this was a hedged statement, and not important enough to reassert over the subsequent 15 years.

In Stiglitz's Globalization and Its Discontents, written in 2002 just after the internet bubble, the big policy blunders where high interest rates, free markets, the 'fear of default' by lenders, and a lack of concern for the poor. He specifically mentions that Greenspan was excessively concerned with inflation during the 1990's, constraining the Clinton's ability to create economic growth. So, the easy money, lack of concern with default, and insufficient initiatives targeted to the poor, all arguments that he now asserts caused the 2008 crash, would seem to be right out of his playbook. Consistency is for non-experts, I guess.

In his 2006 book, Making Globalization Work, Stiglitz praises Japan, Korea, and China, for their high-minded government policies and trade restrictions as an impetus for growth. Now, modern economies all have government of at least 25% of the economy, and many regulations on businesses. Any success could be a result of some governmental interference, which are many. But to be convincing, one would have to do a true cross-country comparison, and like typical theorist his idea of data is anecdote. The Asian Tigers, West Germany's Adenauer, Chile, recent ascent of Ireland are all ignored. As is the fact that China and India moved considerably towards free markets at the same time their growth rate rose, or that Japan and Korea are less regulated than most nations.

Stiglitz's two most prominent papers are papers he coauthored: "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information", The American Economic Review (1981), and his “On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient. Markets”, American Economic Review (1980). He has always been a theorist, not an empiricist.

Grossman and Stiglitz's "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets" flows naturally from Grossman's work on getting information into prices, and Stiglitz's obsession with market imperfection (which came from his fawning work on Samuelson's collected works, which tended to emphasize market imperfections). I have never seen an empirical application of this paper. It's often used as a profound proof that markets aren't efficient, for those who think the relevant standard is perfection. If all information is totally transparent, symmetric, and logical, nobody trades securities with anyone, like what Stokey and Milgrom proved in their No-Trade Theorem (1982, Information, Trade and Common Knowledge, Journal of Economic Theory).

What really bothers me about the paper is its pretentiousness, as if they proved something profound. They proved something obvious. Sure the proof is hard (you solve a differential equation and there's a chi-squared distribution), but the results aren't surprising to anyone. A really neat theory should be important (in this case: maybe), succinct proof (no), and slightly surprising(not!). G&S have all these results in the paper that are really obvious, like the greater the noise, the less informative the price system will be, or the lower the utility of the uninformed, etc. Stigler and Hayek basically argued the same idea, that all the theoretical papers that assume 'perfect competition' and perfect foresight basically assume no need for the market: the data sufficient for a central planner is assumed available. Yet, economies need entrepreneurs and businessmen seizing profits precisely because relevant information is parochial and flawed. Decentralized decision-making takes advantage of decentralized information, and profits are the incentive. So, his demonstration the market perfection is never, technically, true, isn't a critique of the market, it's why many free marketers believe what they do.

In their seminal paper on credit rationing, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) posed the question: “Why is credit rationed?”. In a perfect capital market with all information available to everyone banks give risk adjusted credits to borrowers of different types. Banks choose in a perfect competition the interest rate such that they achieve zero profits in equilibrium. Stiglitz and Weiss by contrast consider an imperfect credit market in which banks cannot observe the types of the borrowers. With two borrower types, that means that a bank does not know whether a safe or a risky borrower is applying for credit. They assume that all borrower types have the same expected return, but riskier projects offer a higher return in case of success (because of the standard debt contract that has limited upside and 100% loss downside), at the cost of a lower probability of success compared to safe projects.

At any interest rate, the expected profit is thus higher for the risky borrowers than for the safe borrowers. Therefore, the risky borrowers are willing to pay a higher interest rate and still make non-negative profit. So it would be effective for a bank to charge lower interest rates from the safe borrowers and higher interest rates from the riskier investors, but because banks lack the knowledge of the risk types, they set a common interest rate for both borrower classes, which yields zero profit. An equilibrium with credit rationing is necessary for banks give credit to both risk types at a common interest rate. Safe borrowers effectively cross subsidize risky borrowers. This is an inefficient outcome because it rations safe borrowers.

Notice this is inefficient because lenders make safe borrowers subsidize risky borrowers, because of ‘imperfect information’. Yet, banks usually do not have zero information on borrowers as Stiglitz and Weiss assume, but rather, imperfect information. Risky borrowers, via FICO scores and down payment (ie, equity investment in the collateral), pay more on average. In contrast, the major government initiatives, such as Health Care programs, charge everyone the same, which is why people don't like these programs when they aren't cross-subsidized by the non-participants (eg, Medicaid). Thus, to the extent charging everyone the same is inefficient, it is much more prevalent in government initiatives than private ones. Yet, because he proved the market is imperfect relative to perfect information, Stiglitz then merely notes this proves markets are inefficient, and thus government is better, a highly dubious inference given the way government works even when lots of information is available (ie, without a pnl objective, or better information, or less irrationality or selfishness by individuals working for the government).

In sum, Stiglitz generates the same platitudes you hear from typical far left-wing types (eg, the market is inefficient therefore dominated by government, the market leads to a race to the bottom). His arguments supporting his policy preferences are inconsistent. His Nobel prize winnung research did not, does not, forcefully prove we should always be increasing government as he assumes (he notes government gave us the internet, biotech, and ‘research and developement’ --i.e., Tang).

Monday, March 01, 2010

Macroeconomist Phelps States Macroeconomics Progressing

In this EconTalk episode, Russ Roberts interviews Nobel prizewinner and macroeconomists Edmund Phelps about macro (his main contribution was to note the Phillips curve was wrong, there is a 'natural level' of unemployment and no long run trade off between unemployment and inflation). Phelps states that macro has been very productive over the last generation.

I disagree. The main issues in macro, what is the optimal size of the government in the economy? As the size of the government in the US have grown pretty constistently over the past 100 years, with episodic upswings and downswings during major wars, suggests policy makers and voters think it has always been too small. For all the shrill excorations about market fundamentalism, and the emphasis on markets, markets have been a shrinking part of the economy. So, what is 'the fact' that needs explanation, the rise of the intellectual basis for markets, or the rise in the attractiveness of government? It seems famous, credentialed economists disagree (eg, Friedman, North, vs. Stiglitz, Krugman).

Phelps thinks we know a lot more about the economy, and by this he means, I think, that several theoretical innovations--the Phillips curve, the steady growth of money ensuring steady growth--have been proven wrong. So, some ideas have been rejected, and in that sense we know more. But there have been many innovations--overlapping generations models, dynamic programming, Hansen's generalized method of moments--have shown themselves to not really focus our efforts, but rather allows everyone to add rigor showing that some things could be true. That's hardly helpful, in that theories that explain everything explain nothing, and bad ideas are a dime a dozen (ie, developing an enthusiasm for the Phillips curve, and proving it wrong, is hardly progress).

So, we currently have debates about the value of the multiplier, where values over 1 suggest government spending is good, less than 1 means counterproductive (assuming that government and private consumption and investment have the same value, ie, the cost is the value created). Robert J. Barro--a well respected economist--suggests a value of -1.1. Joseph Stiglitz--a well respected economist--argues that the multiplier is around 2.0 (1.5 in the short run). Monetary policy currently targets a nominal GDP via the Taylor rule, an ad hoc policy that is indifferent to how much of GDP is inflation or real growth, so it reflects nothing that macro theorists have figured out, but rather, a reasonable rule of thumb. There is no consensus on why poor countries are poor (Easterly: too much top-down control; Stiglitz: too much markets, too little government spending).

I think the only thing macroeconomists have learned, is that Soviet style socialism does not generate higher growth than non-Soviet style socialism, and this fact wasn't predicted by any economic consensus, but rather, the obvious failure of the Soviet Union, and the comparison of countries like East and West Germany, or North and South Korea.

Friday, February 26, 2010

Krugman's Petulance Explained

A long New Yorker piece looks at Paul Krugman, and he clearly is one of those high functioning, socially obtuse nerds one meets all the time in quantitative fields. That is, he has some amount of Asperger's, which means he has trouble seeing things from other's perspectives. Thus, everyone who disagrees with him is 1) an idiot or 2) evil. He can't imagine it otherwise.

Tuesday, February 23, 2010

Sowell's Intellectuals and Society

I really loved Sowell's latest book Intellectuals and Society. As I'm a big fan of Friederich Hayek, the application of his seminal insight about how the market effectively decentralizes decision making was really enjoyable. That is, Sowell notes that intellectuals don't know the essential information of parochial time and place that is so essential. It is easy to dismiss this knowledge because it tends to be pedestrian, not elegant or sophisticated. Yet there are so many different essential facts, the sum of this simple knowledge adds up to 100 times whatever is known by intellectuals like Paul Krugman or Ezra Klein, who pontificate on their industrial policies as if such details don't matter. Intellectuals have a tendency to dismiss this because they have often been the smartest person in the room growing up, and naturally assume this greater knowledge is also present when considering health care or energy policy, but it's just one of those insights that isn't obvious because they have always gotten an A+ on their term papers, which never actually were implemented.

The stupidity of government do-gooder regulators was really highlighted for me last weekend. My wife doesn't work, staying home with our 2 year-old Izzie. She would often go to our health club after our boys are at school, around 9 AM, where there is a childcare facility and she can have a leisurely workout. She found they needed help, and she knows people there, so she works there part time, around 4-hour shifts, while Izzie is in childcare. She enjoys the break from the kids, the adult comaraderie, and Izzie has fun playing with other kids in a room just down the hall from my wife. Yet last weekend OSHA, the US agency that 'regulates workplace safety' determined that this could not stand, because the health club's child care center was not licensed for such service (greater than 2 hours). Supposedly, they would need some extra-special licensed childcare, which would then be too expensive to the club. So, because some bureaucrat decided they would save workers from the evils of firm childcare, the health club loses out on my wife's cheap labor, my wife loses out on some quality no-kid/adult time, and Izzie loses out on playing with her snot-nosed buddies. Lose-lose-lose.

The New Republic's Alan Wolfe harshly reviewed the book, but precisely because he is the type of intellectual Sowell is criticizing. Indeed, he criticizes a couple of New Republic founders, so it surely hit home. Surely, Sowell makes generalizations that aren't always true (as if any generalization is always true), and even the really obtuse intellectuals had some neat insights, stylish prose, and witty ripostes. Yet net-net, I think Sowell is spot on. The contractor that can build houses on time and on budget, is so much more useful to society than any intellectuals with their trenchant insights on society. Yet, allowing them to interact in the market without top down direction is rarely considered optimal, as if that is like building a bridge without blueprints. It rarely occurs to them we need the government to get out of the way, as opposed to apply another top-down fix. Further, many of our big benefactors--Henry Ford, Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller--are presented as Robber Barons by intellectuals, as if they were parasites and not wealth creators. Haiti and many other countries could use those kind of people.

He's one of those lucky writer who writes books basically full time, with paid assistants, and it shows, as the book reads well with appropriate examples (I wish I had a helper for my book!).

Placebo Effect in Drug Tests

It's common practice for FDA tests to prove their worth in 'double blind' tests: the dispenser and the recipient both don't know who gets the sugar pills, who gets the real thing. That way, one can account for the well documented placebo effect, which is that people respond positively to any putative action. But, it turns out this isn't really well captured. From the New Yorker:
But antidepressants have side effects, and sugar pills don’t. Commonly, side effects of antidepressants are tolerable things like nausea, restlessness, dry mouth, and so on. This means that a patient who experiences minor side effects can conclude that he is taking the drug, and start to feel better, and a patient who doesn’t experience side effects can conclude that she’s taking the placebo, and feel worse. On Kirsch’s calculation, the placebo effect—you believe that you are taking a pill that will make you feel better; therefore, you feel better—wipes out the statistical difference [in most psychiatric drugs].

Yikes! That seems like a major blunder. Given the FDA bureaucracy, I doubt it's going to be addressed anytime soon (ie, before I die).

Wednesday, February 17, 2010

Progressive Competition

The real magic of the invisible hand is based on two pillars: self interested action to motivate people, and competition. Without competition, self interest leads to monopolies and sloth, but workers compete with other workers, and companies compete with other companies, we get better workers and widgets.

So one would think that opening up states for real competition would be an obviously good idea. Yet it is highly instructive what progressives think about competition and markets, that they approve of only highly constrained competition that basically neuters it. In Minnesota, we have 3 health care providers, and they all have highly regulated choice offerings. We have 68 mandates, meaning, I am paying for things I would not otherwise pay for (osteopathy, chiropracter, port-wine stain elimination). Insurance means exchanging a certain small payment for an uncertain large payment; in this case, I'm paying for many things I'll certainly never use. If providers all have to provide identical service menus, entitling consumers all they can get from that list, this is not competition.

It's as if the state decided that food was too important for the mere market, and so gave us all food insurance. We paid a special food contribution (not a tax!), and we were all entitled to a buffet offered by 3 different private companies. The buffet has to include traditional American fare, as well as Chinese, Mexican, Italian, Korean (dog), etc.--68 mandates in all. Most people don't want all the choices they pay for, but as they don't pay when they eat most people do not notice they are paying for things they don't eat. Now, as the food budget as a percent of GDP in America grows, and Americans are not any healthier than other developed countries, people ask, hey, can I just buy what I want to eat? The government tells you 'no', that is just a race to the bottom, and your stupid, irrational inclinations will cause you to buy the medical equivalent of a pet rock.

So we have 3 buffets but the same menus, no out-of-pocket spending, and no real competition. This is what progressives think of as 'the market'. They convince themselves things will get better if they have even more top-down control (single payer) because then they could implement technological and logistic innovations (cutting out the darn middle man) that will lower costs, all the while keeping health care employment levels and compensation rates the same. One might be tempted to say, it can't get worse than the status quo, but that what the Russians said in 1917, and boy were they wrong.

Sunday, February 14, 2010

Valentine's Day Sexonomics

Steve Levitt's Freakonomics bestseller highlighted that many quirky phenomenon can be analyzed using economic reasoning, or really, assuming individuals are self interested, and applying statistics and logic to that. Many people find this application of 'economics' much more interesting than applying such logic to widgets or muni bonds, so why not just get all those cost and indifference curves in price/quantity space out of economics textbooks, and replace with sexy pictures and fun sex trivia? One could then see economic lessons on Spike TV, right after Manswers. After all, sex is an object of exchange just like any other commodity, but a lot more fun for college-aged students to contemplate.

For example, Charlotte Allen's article on the New Dating Game, and Lori Gottlieb's book on why women should settle rather than become spinsters, brought forth a lot of 'Freakonomic' issues around dating, sex and marriage, and generated considerable blog buzz (see Robin Hansen, Slate, Jezebel). Writing about these matters is always sure to get people excited, because these are issues people feel they understand pretty well, so people who disagree are way wrong! This got me thinking about the fun book, Mathematics and Sex, which is good nerd porn. Consider the application of economic models to the following issues:

Asset pricing: Choosing a young man for a long-term mate means evaluating his future value; you don't want a young hottie who won't age well. Hot Chippendale dancers with low intelligence aren't good buys. But then, if you want to get the next billionaire, should you try to find the next Bill Gates or Warren Buffet? These are true nerds, and at 18 they weren’t attractive to most women (Buffet writes candidly about his social ineptness as a young man). So, should women glom on to nerds? Well, it could be that nerds have a higher top return, but lower average return, so this isn't optimal even abstracting from their obviously lower current value. Fads based on conspicuous successes can alter the value of current young men. Perhaps your dad was a prior bubble (eg, he was good at 'the hustle').

Labor Economics: A lot of labor issues are about cartels: monopsonies, such as one-firm towns as when mining companies employed a plurality of people in a town, or monopolies as when unions prevent companies from negotiating with individual employees. Historically men have dominated women in the sense of having more political and monetary power, so, why not have all women form a cartel, as in Lysistrata, withholding sex to get men to be nicer? The problem is this is not robust to defection. One woman, presumably an opportunistic woman of lower quality (eg, a "2"), could offer sex to a high quality man and thus snag a top male. Once this happens, the coalition falls like a house of cards. Indeed, Milton Friedman predicted that the OPEC oil cartel would eventually fail because such cartels are inherently fragile.

Game Theory: Thomas Schelling highlighted the benefits of being irrational, because if you convince other countries you will blow the world up if they launch an atomic bomb at you, you actually deter their use of the bomb. Committing to an irrational response, is rational. In a similar way, prudish mores about sex can make everyone in society better off, because without stigma and shame of having sex outside a pair-bond, there's massive sexual inequality and lower parental investment. Consider that monogamy is good for beta or omega males, because that keeps alpha males with only one female. But if sexual morality becomes unpopular, serial monogamy (aka one-night stands) will be a dominant strategy for those with the highest value, because they can. Those with the most to gain from such activity will do it most, further eroding the quaint stigma attached to casual sex, encouraging more of it. Those with low value will try to have casual sex to signal they have higher value, leading to an equilibrium like when Charlton Heston comes down from the mountain with the 10 commandments and it's the best frat party ever (soon ruined by a vengeful God, and as always the people who didn't rush are very envious). Charlotte Adam's piece on the New Dating Game basically suggests this is what is happening, leading to alpha males having many partners, omega males left out, and women of all qualities tolerating philandering men who aren't there to raise the kids (aka, 'restoring primate-style hypergamy').

Supply/Demand curve elasticities: Men's demand for sex more inelastic, in that they need sex more than women. Just look at the sex frequency of gays vs. lesbians, and you see that men prefer more sex than women. One reason may be that a sex act implies a much higher probability of orgasm for men than women, so if the present value of sex is the expected orgasmic payoff, it’s strictly higher for men. In any case, women can extract compensation from men in return for sex, because the person with the higher elasticity has the market power. Ergo, men have to bring more to the transaction than their bodies, they have to pay for dates, open doors, put the toilet seat down, etc. Indeed, on a day-to-day basis, a woman's lower sexual desire negates a man’s physical or monetary advantage, which is why most women are at least co-equals in their relationships.

Public Choice Theory: median voter theory suggests that candidates merge to slightly different takes on the median position. However, when political issues are considered multidimensional rather than single dimensional, an agenda setter could start at any point in the issue space and, by strategically selecting issues end up at any other point in the issue space, so that there is no unique and stable outcome. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem highlights that there is no way a multidimensional person can be unambiguously ranked, in that there is always some arbitrariness how you weigh, say, personality vs. physical attractiveness, or within looks, face vs body, or within a face, skin tone vs symmetry (eg, there are many important dimensions). So one clear implication is to emphasize, like Maureen Dowd, your best attributes as best for everyone, and pooh-pooh the status quo preferences that highlight the Beyonce's and their male equivalents as vulgar, uneducated and short sighted.

Search Theory: Date 37 men. That is a sample of men who reveal a desire to match with you. You want to maximize your mate’s quality. This is the optimal stopping problem, or secretary problem, because you sequentially select from a sample of a population, and at some time have to settle down to enjoy the benefits of that person (eg, you eventually want to ‘use’ the secretary/mate), and you can’t go back (always pathetic, ‘hey, remember me? It turns out I was wrong and you are the best I can do. Want to go out again?’). A practical solution that is near optimal is to lock on to your next partner that is better than best of the original 37, which presumably increases the odds of finding your best match from 1% to 37%(that seems like a lot to me, but hey, he proved it). That's probably near your best match given your type.

Pooling vs. Separating Equilibria: in a pooling equilibrium, the good and bad apples are mixed together, so you price them as the average. This leads to breakdown in markets, because no one will sell good apples if they are assumed half-good. Quality signals will be costly, because otherwise they lead to pooling equilibrium. One thing men want is fertility, which is correlated with attributes like waist-to-hip ratios (optimally 0.69—heh—for women, 0.92 for men), clear skin, white sclera, and women’s magazines often highlight ways for middle aged women to enhance these attributes. One thing women want in men is money, so they find men with BMWs more attractive than men in Dodge Neons (indeed, women have a higher frequency of orgasm with higher wealth men).

Obviously, one could come up with enough examples and applications to replace Mankiw with something much more salacious and of interest to the mass of 18-21 year olds learning economics. It's not as if the application of economics to the study of GDP and employment has elevated the nature of political debates over the past 100 years.

Thursday, February 11, 2010

Math Hard, Society Easy?

From the Chronicle of Higher Education:
The social sciences are easier than the natural sciences, according to second graders.

Adults more or less agree. A study published in the Journal of Experimental Psychology took a look at which disciplines children and adults thought were the most difficult to learn. For the most part, people of all ages think psychology is easy and physics is hard. That bias begins early and changes some, but not much, the older we get.

One of the most interesting things we learned in Artificial Intelligence is that what we consider hard, like chess and multiplication, is easy for a computer. What we consider easy--like recognizing emotions on faces, or visually distinguishing between a dog and a cat--a computer finds quite difficult. What is hard for us, is only because we know the right answer, and know how difficult it is to do the logic in our head. Most thoughts we take for granted are really quite complex, yet because we can't even begin to write down how we do it, we do not realize it.

The social sciences are much harder than the physical sciences or math, in that our progress has been much slower here than in these areas. An educated man knows a lot more math or physics than a child or hunter-gatherer; he does not know much more about what causes business cycles. Figuring out why Haiti is so poor, or how interest rates affect investment, is really difficult. However, it is easy for someone to articulate an answer to hard social issues that is not obviously wrong, which makes it easy to think one knows the answer. A wrong math or physics answer, is clearly wrong, and if you have worked with people who knows something quantitative you learn quite quickly how ignorant you are in that area.

Don't confuse the inability to falsify with having figured something out. It generally means you just don't know what you don't know.

Tuesday, February 09, 2010

Naive Anthropomorphisms


Children's stories contain animals, even objects, that have human-like characteristics. They have not only intentions, but often faces. Further, they are either good or bad. Only later do we learn that most of the world is not so much malicious as indifferent. Hopefully, we learn that many most facets of society, such as income distribution, or the creation of cities, of technologies, is an emergent phenomenon, created but not designed by individuals, and singular individuals mainly help us apply a narrative.

So, smarmy Elizabeth Warren, writes an article today that suggests all bank policy is the result of bank CEO intentions. They " brought the economy to its knees", and now are "determined to stop any kind of watchdog" (the SEC, Fed, FDIC, OCC, and state insurance regulators don't seem to count). They are "bonus babies who were so short-sighted that they put the economy at risk and contributed to the destruction of their own companies". She shows not mere mistrust, but contempt for the the financial market she plans on controlling. As William F. Buckley put it, I would rather have Citibank be run by the first 100 names in the Boston phone directory than a bunch of Harvard professors.

I've worked with a CEO of a large financial organization. He was a nice guy, but he had very little to do with the pricing, product design, or other tactical strategic issues in the bank. He managed 'the process', personalities, did public relations, and perhaps championed a handful of corporate actions such as acquisitions. To personify the banking industry's actions as the will of their individual leaders, is like saying that America does what Obama wants it to do. They have more of a say than anyone, but it's still a small say.

If Jamie Dimon wanted to price, say, credit cards at a rate higher, lower, or less nuanced than other banks, more power to him, but if that tactic started losing money, it would be abandoned, and if it made money it would be copied. That's how the market works, profits tell banks what to do, losses what not to do. To the extent they are making short term profits, say by lending to windfarms due to a stimulus package windfall, investors are the only ones with real incentives to evaluate and punish firms for this behavior. After all, in Washington, they not only still encourage home loans with only 3.5% down, they shamelessly blame bankers for lending too much to home buyers while boasting about their affordable housing initiatives that made any regulatory concern about lower underwriting criteria impossible, and indeed sued firms, and blocked their mergers, if they did not meet lending targets to people who by definition had little income (historically underserved communities).

That someone with such a understanding of complex financial institutions highlights her naiveté, as if things are what they are, not because they are an equilibrium of borrower and saver preferences, but rather, the whims of The Captains of Industry in their top hats. To give her power, would merely reinforce what everyone in the industry knows, that Washington regulators are out-of-touch. For her, competition is simply a "race to the bottom to develop new ways to trick customers", and so we should expect her to create a 'stable' industry, like in our education and postal industries, where there is limited competition but lots of guarantees, and little or no productivity growth. She knows what banking customers want, and so doesn't trust a market to provide quality services and products because evil CEOs hypnotize their customers into thinking they want things they really don't. A better definition of a do-gooder cannot be found. I think she might be successful in her primary objective, in that socialists countries were immune from financial crises. I just think she doesn't realize this cripples GDP growth, as highlighted by the Cold War 'experiment'. After all, you can keep a pet from getting sick by killing it, if that's your sole objective.

Bad things aren't the result of evil intentions, so much as smart people overconfident in their ability to make the world a better place. They see people who disagree with their means as disagreeing with their ends, totally dismissing the possibility that they could be making things worse. She thinks her new fiefdom, the CFPA , will "consolidate seven separate bureaucracies, cut down on paperwork, and promote understandable consumer products. In the process, it will stabilize the industry, rebuild confidence in the securitization market, and leave more money in the pockets of families". ORLY? When has a new bureaucracy reduced bureaucracy? When has it 'cut down on paperwork'? The pages of fine print and endless places to initial are because of our laws and regulations, not in spite them. Will the bureaucracy make people wealthier? Well, government's the main place of employment growth, so I guess things are looking up.

Monday, February 08, 2010

Emotions Annoying but Necessary

When I was writing my dissertation in 1994, I had to avoid any 'behavioralist' explanation because these were considered ad hoc. This really stymied me because my main finding that low volatility stocks had higher than average returns didn't fit into any rational framework. Now the pendulum is on the other side, and behavioralist explanation need hardly any support more than an anecdote or introspection to motivate an empirical finding. We are obviously irrational, emotional, and use predictably irrational heuristics to make sense of the world. The question remains, are these explanations helpful, or simply ex post rationalizations? As Eugene Fama notes, half the behavioralist findings suggest overextrapolation (representativeness bias), half underextrapolation (anchoring bias), the average being 'rational'.

This subject was highlighted in a Bloggingheads TV post between Eliezer Yudkowsky and Razib Kahn. They ponder whether people are more problematically stupid or crazy. I'd go with crazy. Stupidity is a problem, but the really harmful ideas come from the smart people who believe in bad ideas, and the most imaginative people are the most credulous, because for them everything is possible if we just implement their master plan.

A lot of psychotherapy, if not philosophy, is based on letting go of emotions (the Serenity Prayer, Zen Buddhism), because anxiety makes us feel bad. As Hamlet said, 'There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so'. It's a nice thought, that we have nothing to fear but fear itself. Yet fear, and anxiety, do have a function. I find it interesting that children are learning at a much faster rate than adults, and one of the most distinguishing characteristics of children is the are much more emotional than adults, with more frequent and stronger mood swings; little kids cry a lot, adults almost never (curiously, I currently am only tempted to tear up during movies). I have met many very smart people, and they are often quite emotional. They are prone to paranoia, conspiracies, feeling either too proud or too ashamed of themselves at times. I don't think this correlation is an accident.

I think if you look closely at any thoughtful person, you will find attributes in their personality that border on some DSM disorder. The only people I know really well who seem totally normal are rather shallow, they have no great emotions that drive them to really interesting opinions. As Abraham Lincoln noted, 'It has been my experience that folks who have not vices have very few virtues.'

Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio studied people who had received brain injuries that had had one specific effect: to damage that part of the brain where emotions are generated (see David Brooks talking about it here). In all other respects they seemed normal - they just lost the ability to feel emotions. The interesting thing Damasio found was that their ability to make decisions was seriously impaired. Ask what restaurant they want to go to, they would dither, and consider an infinite number of considerations but never choose. They are lacking the emotion that allows them to mark things as good, bad, or indifferent, so without any emotional state they just see more data, often with conflicting implications. In particular, many decisions have pros and cons on both sides, and without emotions, the net result is ambiguous.

Shall I have the fish or the chicken? With no emotions, people are unable to make the decision.

I think this is related to the Ellsberg's paradox, which is the observation that people prefer to bet they will find a 'blue' ball if there are 50 blue and 50 red balls in an urn, as opposed to one where there's a 50% chance an urn contains 100 blue balls, and a 50% chance an urn contains 100 red balls. In the latter, the information is kind of incomplete, one can imagine others know whether the urn has blue or red balls, and is so arbitraging you. In the former, with a known 50% blue frequency, you are safe. Similarly, if your information set is incomplete, because you have not exhausted the state space of potentially informative data, you are potentially making a blatantly suboptimal choice. As shown in the paper 'Fact-Free Learning', looking for the set of inputs that maximizes an R2 is computationally hard. The problem is so pervasive that it has been canonized in literature: Sherlock Holmes regularly explains how the combination of a variety of clues leads inexorably to a particular conclusion, to which Watson exclaims, “Of course!” Once you know the answer, it's obvious, and it's scary to think an obvious explanation is out there, but you were merely too lazy to find it.

So, without a little built-in anxiety, a little homunculus who hates dithering, we would 'rationally' sift through all the data forever, because the state space we are searching for is not well defined, and it could provide an 'aha!' moment. But our whiney anxiety impulse pushes us to decide, which is a good thing, because we have finite lives, and many things to do.

Thursday, February 04, 2010

Heidegger is no Paradox


Martin Heidegger is one the twentieth century's most important philosophers. His Sein und Zeit gets one thinking about what does it mean to be? Yet, in the end such musings remind me of Bertrand Russell's observation that "If any philosopher had been asked for a definition of infinity, he might have produced some unintelligible rigmarole, but he would certainly not have been able to give a definition that had any meaning at all."

Anyway, there's a neat BBC video on Martin Heidegger, which spends a lot of time on Heidegger's life, but little on his ideas. Most interestingly, they spend about half the time discussing the 'paradox' that he was also a virulent Nazi. How could someone so wise is the ways of philosophy be so wrong on something so important?

Simple. It's no paradox that Hitler was nice to dogs and children, that Noam Chomsky is a great linguist and an apologist for every anti-American illiberal regime, that Isaac Newton believed in Biblically inspired numerology, or that someone who is really good at a parochial models of economic interaction would support socialism. My beliefs are not shaken by the fact that someone really smart thinks the opposite on some political issue--what crackpot idea does not have someone really smart who believes it? People have multiple selves, in some contexts, agreeable and insightful, in others closed and clueless.

Most importantly, politics is the arena of ideas that are not 'decidable' in the sense that one can logically prove any currently popular idea is 'wrong', and smart people are good at logic, not prioritizing uncertain hypotheses. Over time wrong ideas, like communism, have their wrongness exposed via empirical contradictions, as when the Eastern Bloc was neither more prosperous or free than the West even though it was putatively for 'the people'. In 1950, most of the best economists thought socialism would economically dominate the perceived anarchy and inefficiency of market oriented economies.

Brake Problems Old as Time

Toyota is doing damage control, primarily because the audio on this car crash is so horrifying, so vivid, they figure they will lose that case no matter what. But I remember a big brouhaha back in the 80's on 'sudden acceleration syndrome', and the more investigative reporters investigated, the more evidence they found it existed! But in the end, as many people swore on their bible that they were hitting the brake, it turned out that 'pedal misapplication' was the problem. The key is to put the brake on the other side of the car, as in Medicare-mobiles like Cadillac.

PJ O'Roarke discussed this way back in his really funny book, Parliament of the Whores:
Yes the dumb buggers stepped on the gas instead of the brakes. These 'sudden-accelleration incidents' or SAIs closely resemble those sudden-unintelligence incidents, or SUIs, that many of us have experienced with our automobiles, especially when we were in our teens or early twenties...."

Now, if we could just work on a problem particular to Lincoln Continentals: farmer's markets seem to jump right out in front of them.

Tuesday, February 02, 2010

Profits Are Good

A lot of people seem to find Goldman's profits rather disturbing--these guys are in it for themselves! That can't be good! Ah, but Economics was created as a separate discipline based on the insight that the unintended consequences of self interest are, often, quite good. As even today most people find this incredibly difficult to believe, I figure I would point to some seminal references on this. After all, profits are not bad, losses are, and it's good to remember that.

The magic of the free market is based fundamentally on the assumption that people are self interested, and so profits are sought after, and losses shunned. Given sufficient freedom of entry and property rights, firms will compete for those profits and in the process generate greater consumer surplus for your average schlub. Today's doofus lives a pretty good life relative to his counterpart in the middle ages, through neither his doofus antecedents or the conscious intentions of his actual benefactors

This is the invisible hand that magically transforms the greed of individuals into a social good totally orthogonal to their explicit intention. That it is a truly remarkable insight is reflected by how counterintuitive it is to this day. I think the underlying reason most intellectuals do not trust the free market is because they feel that left to itself, the market tends to monopoly, inefficient outcomes as highlighted in RollerBall, or It's a Wonderful Life. Global Warming and health care policy concerns are both, in a sense, driven by the intuition that without top-down guidance, we are like airplane passengers without a pilot, doomed to catastrophe.

But, markets do force profits to zero, as anyone in business can attest. Not immediately, but over only a few years. The best descriptions of the competitive process and how it is consistent with efficiency, for me starts with Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, in which Frank Knight describes how people respond to profit opportunities, and how this both lowers profits and provides lower costs to consumers. Friederich Hayek's most important essay, The Use of Knowledge in Society, noted the way the price system aggregates information in a way a Politburo could not, and I quote it at length only because what he says here is what virtually every free-marketer tries to say all the time (to little avail):

... or the arbitrageur who gains from local differences of commodity prices, are all performing eminently useful functions based on special knowledge of circumstances of the fleeting moment not known to others.
...
To gain an advantage from better knowledge of facilities of communication or transport is sometimes regarded as almost dishonest, although it is quite as important that society make use of the best opportunities in this respect as in using the latest scientific discoveries. This prejudice has in a considerable measure affected the attitude toward commerce in general compared with that toward production. Even economists who regard themselves as definitely immune to the crude materialist fallacies of the past constantly commit the same mistake where activities directed toward the acquisition of such practical knowledge are concerned—apparently because in their scheme of things all such knowledge is supposed to be "given."
...
Of course, these adjustments are probably never "perfect" in the sense in which the economist conceives of them in his equilibrium analysis. But I fear that our theoretical habits of approaching the problem with the assumption of more or less perfect knowledge on the part of almost everyone has made us somewhat blind to the true function of the price mechanism and led us to apply rather misleading standards in judging its efficiency. The marvel is that in a case like that of a scarcity of one raw material, without an order being issued, without more than perhaps a handful of people knowing the cause, tens of thousands of people whose identity could not be ascertained by months of investigation, are made to use the material or its products more sparingly; i.e., they move in the right direction. This is enough of a marvel even if, in a constantly changing world, not all will hit it off so perfectly that their profit rates will always be maintained at the same constant or "normal" level.

...

those who clamor for "conscious direction"—and who cannot believe that anything which has evolved without design should solve problems which we should not be able to solve consciously—should remember this: The problem is precisely how to extend the span of out utilization of resources beyond the span of the control of any one mind; and therefore, how to dispense with the need of conscious control, and how to provide inducements which will make the individuals do the desirable things with


Sandy Grossman won the John Bates Clarke medal in 1988 based on more mathematical demonstrations of this view, how a profit seeking agent gets information into prices, and how this increases welfare.

This is one of those things that, if you believe it is important and generally true, is why you tend to favor market solutions; if you think it's for parochial cases of perfect competition, why you tend to favor top-down solutions. I obviously can't 'prove' why I think it is a better rule of thumb than any alternative, in that there are cases where it is untrue (monopoly, cartels, irrational businessmen). Futher, you can show that if certain increasing returns to scale (eg, Krugman's Nobel insight) are present, or informational asymmetries present (Stigltiz's Nobel insight), a modeler--who knows everything, isn't petty--can improve the equilibrium. I tend to find these exceptions as that, exceptions to a general rule.

More importantly, the solutions to imperfections are not a high-minded as modelers let on, in that while one can prove a situation is inefficient when you have a small set of assumptions, and then, God-like, note that you could make these imaginary people better. Yet one must consider that the bureaucrat in charge of fixing things is just as irrational and self-interested as any businessman or consumer. That is, if you think profits are a poor shepard, what about elections? With majority rule, there is a pressing desire to pass a law taking the money from the top (indirectly, usually). Given wealth and power always has a power-law distribution (fewer on the top than bottom), there will always be a desire by the masses to turn things upside-down. Thus, you have anarchy or coalitions waxing and waning like in the Roman Empire.

Our current climate seems to be that popular politicians are like union bosses or Marxist dictators, chiefs who state they are implementing the People's Will, all the while effecting more power than any CEO. This populist approach can only work within well-defined coalitions, because it necessarily involves Lenin's famous 'Who? Whom?' question (ie, who would prevail over whom?). You can't get power without taking someone down, you can't get patronage jobs without restrictions on entry. There really isn't a powerful coalition for maximizing GDP, because it doesn't exclude and include based on who signs up.

Monday, February 01, 2010

Bob Solow Dismisses High Frequency Trading

At the end of his review on this week's latest book on the recent economic crisis, liberal economist Bob Solow brings in this observation:
I have read that a firm such as Goldman Sachs has made very large profits from having devised ways to spot and carry out favorable transactions minutes or even seconds before the next most clever competitor can make a move...

Now ask yourself: can it make any serious difference to the real economy whether one of those profitable anomalies is discovered now or a half-minute from now? It can be enormously profitable to the financial services industry, but that may represent just a transfer of wealth from one person or group to another. It remains hard to believe that it all adds anything much to the efficiency with which the real economy generates and improves our standard of living.

This kind of reasoning has been going on for a long time, and while introspection is useful, it's really not good for figuring out what other people should do. Some guy thinks to himself, 'what's the use of that?', and decides the world would be a better place not only without that activity. The fact that an academic in Boston can't fathom how something helps the world seems rather unsurprising.

I'll say for the record that I think Puff Daddy is a waste of resources--I have no need for him, and can't understand his celebrity. There are many activities I not only don't do, I judgmentally think people waste time when they do them, but I'm not so arrogant to think that really means they must do something else. It took us decades to figure out that altruism could be based on enlightened self-interest (iterated prisoner's dilemma, reciprocal altruism), so it's a good idea not to throw something out merely because we haven't figured out its benefit in 'the big picture'.

A famous article in 1962 by Fisher, Griliches, and Kaysen (The Costs of Automobile Model Changes since 1949, JPE), argued that the improvements in cars from 1949 were all a waste! Using exacting logic, they noted one could have bought the same 1949 car for $700 less in 1961, and could have used that money to buy coats for the poor or some other 'obviously' better use (after all, 1949 car got from A to B just like the fancy 1962 ones). But, then, one could say the same thing about books: 99.99% of everything written today was said better previously by someone else. Better those people serve the poor or something more obvious than engage in frivolous or redundant work. One could go on and on, because most of the internet is frivolous (porn, games), much liesure activity pointless (football?), etc.

The only problem is with this insight is it isn't obvious how to spend money 'wisely', on say obvious public goods. For example, In the 1990's an activist Kansas City judge decided to mandate the state pay for a first class shool system. The results were typical:
Kansas City spent as much as $11,700 per pupil--more money per pupil, on a cost of living adjusted basis, than any other of the 280 largest districts in the country. The money bought higher teachers' salaries, 15 new schools, and such amenities as an Olympic-sized swimming pool with an underwater viewing room, television and animation studios, a robotics lab, a 25-acre wildlife sanctuary, a zoo, a model United Nations with simultaneous translation capability, and field trips to Mexico and Senegal. The student-teacher ratio was 12 or 13 to 1, the lowest of any major school district in the country.

The results were dismal. Test scores did not rise; the black-white gap did not diminish; and there was less, not greater, integration

William Easterly has discussed the issues of international aid, and how over $2 Trillion dollars have basically been flushed down the toilet. So, good intentions are neither necessary (the unintended benefits of self-interest) or sufficient (charity).

I think it's much better to let people spend their money the way they want (with a few exceptions), and equally importantly make money the way they want. It's a good thing that American car companies, in 1962, didn't think the 1949 model was 'good enough' and then spend it on something obviously of public good, like aid to Africa, or public housing. Such thinking leads to zero productivity growth, and without productivity, we can't pay for things like, public pensions, or actually create things we find really elevating (like the Large Hadron Collider, or Al Gore's Nobel prize winning power point presentation).