One important take-away seem to be, send all the econ bloggers a free copy of your book, because I think it was uniformly rated well in praise surrounding extended quotes (see Tabarrok here, Kling here).I can tell you that there is little upside to slamming a book on your blog, but you might receive a nice note from the publisher, or some nice links from the popular author if you have nice things to say. Book reviews are like stock analyst recommendations pre Sarbanes-Oxley.
Here's a snippet Nocera and Russel's take-away of they big mover in the 2008 crisis:
My interpretation of that has to do with modeling. I think one of the things that happened over the course of the last 20 years is the core idea that you could model away risk. One of the things that was striking in [Greenspan's] apology was when he said: Several people have won Nobel Prizes for the work that has turned out to be flawed.
In other words, 'models' were the main problem. We shouldn't believe so much in models. This is not insightful, because it leads to infinite regress. If you believe models are imprecise, and so add some uncertainty around them, this too is a model. Sure, you can keep compounding your uncertainty, but eventually this leads to avoid lending altogether, which is clearly suboptimal. But then Nocera mentions this pertaining to MBIA:
One of the things we said to them, we asked them about, was their models. They said: Actually, our models were pretty accurate. If we plugged in a 20% decline in housing prices, they showed the world blowing up. But we just assumed that that could never possibly happen! Famous paper by the Orszag brothers and Joseph Stiglitz, who was a Nobel Laureate, showing how remote it is that Fannie or Freddie would ever go bankrupt. Absolutely true.
So, the problem was not essentially models, hubris, or securitization, but rather this singular assumption: that housing prices, nationally, would not fall significantly year-over-year. It is much more parsimonious explanation; it explains more with less.