Tuesday, February 04, 2020

Factor Risk and Return

Factor returns should reflect risk, in that they have traditionally been interpreted as proxies for some kind of risk not measured by beta. The idea is that perhaps what people really care about is whether there will be another oil shock, and nothing matters as much. Stocks that have a high dependence on cheap oil would have more risk than other stocks. In the early 1980s, this was a common hypothesis, though later people would add things like consumption growth and inflation.

Remember that our conception of risk comes from the idea that as utility functions are concave (have decreasing marginal utility), the higher the expected variance in our wealth, the lower the expected utility. Thus, $1 for certain tomorrow is worth more than a payoff with equal probabilities for {$0.50, $1.50}. Because of decreasing marginal utility, one enjoys an extra 50 cents less than one suffers from the 50 cent deficit, so you have to bribe people to make them indifferent to such an alternative, what is called the risk premium.

While most presentations of the CAPM use normal distributions, the initial creators did not simply jump on this assumption blindly because it was convenient, as there was a lot of focus on the best distributional assumption for asset returns.  I took the weekly returns and normalized them by a rolling volatility forecast to capture the heteroskedasticity (otherwise the tails are much fatter). While these deviations from normality are statistically significant, they aren't large. You can see the weekly returns are too frequent at the bottom, offset by the extra number of slightly-above-average returns.

Markowitz considered downside volatility and maximum drawdown among other metrics, and Eugene Fama's dissertation and several subsequent papers investigated the degree to which downside risk outside the normal distribution--aka fat tails--was the big driver. This was all motivated by Benoit Mandelbrot's documentation that many commodity markets had large downside tail returns. If you can get through this paper by Fama (1965), you'll understand why he stopped investigating it: it's boring. [In contrast, the degree to which market crashes overstate 'average' returns is much more interesting, see Barro (2005). But note, this is all about whether the average equity return premium should be reduced by 3%, not a criticism of the CAPM or its spawn.]

You can capture the above deviation from normality in many different ways but they don't add much of any practical value. Levy and Markowitz (1979) documented that the gaussian distribution, for all its faults, is pretty innocuous. All you have to do is increase a person's risk aversion so that they 'feel' the downside risk more strongly, and you capture the effects of fat declines just as you would with some mixed distribution with more parameters. The costs are low, but the benefits are large. Normal distributions are additive (one normal plus another is still normally distributed), which makes statistics a lot easier. A mere 2 parameters describe the entire distribution (all the higher moments are linear functions of the mean and variance). Further, when x is normally distributed, E[ex]=eμ+1/2σ2, which is useful in all sorts of models (eg, exponential utility is of the form 1-e-αx).

I pulled a bunch of portfolio factor data from Ken French's website. It's an awesome resource for anyone into equity risk because it's free and easy to access (no sign-ins or passwords).  For the US I pulled seven factors, the high and low quintiles among the largest 2 size quintiles, for 7 factors: book/market, cashflow/price, earnings/price, volatility, investment (asset growth), prior returns, and accruals.

As a practical matter, most metrics of risk are correlated. Beta and portfolio volatility have incredibly high correlations, so much so they are almost redundant. Minimizing beta or vol is basically the same thing.  The correlation between portfolio volatility and the maximum drawdown is not as high, but still highly significant. To the degree risk is the expected worst-case scenario, volatility/beta should capture a good deal of this.


When we look at the relationship between these risk metrics for various factor portfolios, there is nothing close to a strong correlation. Indeed, the correlation is negative to a first approximation.

For international portfolios, I used book/market, cashflow/price, and earnings/price from several regions. For these, I normalized by subtracting the region-specific volatility and average returns, so that factor performance is comparable.  While risk is no longer negatively correlated with returns, the correlation is weak.


Factor risk premiums do not reflect risk, they explain themselves. Perhaps they are capturing something institutional, like taxes. I came across Phil DeMuth's latest book, The Overtaxed Investor, and he emphasizes the tax advantage of capital gains over dividends. Now if in equilibrium investors have to be indifferent, perhaps the extra 2% earned by high dividend stocks is compensated by the higher tax rate. Transaction costs could be another issue, especially for small-cap stocks, in that it may cost one a couple of percent more to get in and out of these positions, which would not be reflected in end-of-day returns but would your for small-cap investor. Such explanations have nothing to do with risk.

In the latest American Finance Association Presidential Adress, David Hirshleifer presented the following theory by way of an analogy. Moths (supposedly) fly into flames kamikaze-style, as they are hard-wired to fly towards the moon to get their bearings. Clearly, this isn't good for the moths, but rather, a rule-of-thumb that does not extrapolate well, especially after man discovered fire. Perhaps our monkey brains have similar lacunae. For example, many remember dating someone crazy because she was super hot, not because men like crazy girls, but rather, crazy girls do hot things that cause men's limbic system to shut down the cerebral cortex (this is now a meme, but young fools will only learn by experience). Similarly, investors could be attracted to risk, not directly, but rather, the fact that risky stocks have attractive attributes like stories about transforming the workplace, or they have pot-smoking CEOs, or that they specifically focus more on marketing to investors as opposed to consumers.

While I agree with most people that many investors are ignorant and susceptible to biases, these suboptimal decision-makers are a poor explanation for equilibrium asset prices; their bad decision-making is mainly evinced by excessive trading. It doesn't take many smart traders to figure out that if they steel themselves against those risky-stock promoters they can make large risk-adjusted returns. It's not complicated, you don't have to tie yourself against a mast like Odysseus, just don't listen to conference calls or watch CNBC, and instead just crunch datasets where all you know about ABC corp are its objective metrics.  Then buy the wallflower stocks and sell the crazy/hot ones. Arbitrageurs should counteract behavior biases in asset markets with free entry.

Biases, departures from normality, and new factors don't explain why anything reasonably correlated with something related to wealth volatility has no correlation with average returns. This leaves the utility function. With relative risk, there should be no risk premium just as there isn't one. This makes factor investing much less attractive because, without the risk adjustment that accentuates the alpha, you just have the potential for making 2% extra but have to take on more risk to do so (by deviating from the market, creating benchmark risk).  It's not like there are $20 bills lying on the floor, but rather, a bunch of change in a fountain, and you can grab a handful if you don't mind getting soaking wet and mean looks. 

Tuesday, January 28, 2020

Is the Fama-French Model Dead?

When I was in graduate school at Northwestern in the early 90s the hot financial topics were all related to finding and estimating risk factors: Arbitrage Pricing Theory via latent factors  (Connor and Koraczyk 1986), Kalman filter state-space models (eg, Stock and Watson 1989), and method of moment estimators (Lars Hansen 1982). These appealed to central limit theorem proofs, which is the academic dream, as math proofs decisively prove objective meta-knowledge, how to know important things. Learning such methods involved intelligence and hard work, promising an instant barrier to entry, and certainly not from those boorish B-school students who had much better parties but didn't know statistics, let alone measure theory.

Around that same time, Eugene Fama and Ken French were looking at the returns of low and high dividend stocks by simply sorting them and looking at the basic statistics of these portfolios (see here). While Fama was well-respected for his theoretical work on defining efficient markets and his seminal 1973 paper confirming the capital asset pricing model (ie, the CAPM), he seemed like one of those antediluvian economists who typified the 1970s. Indeed, if you read those old papers, you will be amazed by how simple they were--you can understand them on one read--making the many inevitable false-positives glaringly obvious (with hindsight).

But then in 1992 Fama and French published their blockbuster 3-factor model documenting that if you sort stocks first by size and then by beta there is no correlation between beta and stocks. The previous finding was the product of an omitted variable, size. That is, one might look at humans and find hair length inversely correlated with height: longer hair correlates with shorter humans. But if you note women have longer hair than men and control for that, the correlation goes away; hair has nothing to do with height.

Size and value were identified in the late 70s, often in accounting journals. Fama and French's analysis was simple but the results were too strong to dismiss, especially as Fama was not some accounting noob, but rather, someone who understood risk and expected returns. Fama and French hypothesized size and value premiums implied they proxied risks that affect investors but academics can't measure, just as we can see the effects of dark matter but not the dark matter itself.

Still, many researchers were burned by false findings, and value and size were discovered in the same naive way of simply finding a strong pattern and presuming it's real as opposed to an order statistic (see here DeBondt and Thaler's list of anomalies circa 1989). While F-F said they were risk proxies, it seemed ad hoc. Economic theory implies risk premiums in that the sine qua non of economics, the utility function, implies a risk premium in an if and only if relation (which implies B ⇒ A and A ⇒ B). [my take: the error here is applying it to an individual's wealth, it works great for ice cream and shoes.] Add to this 20 years where economists learned that the CAPM model had been proven ('a peer-reviewed fact,' they would say today), and you have a strong bias that is not going to be discarded after some simple analysis. You can identify such researchers in the past--many still plying their trade--by how they would introduce their findings via moment conditions (see Harvey and Siddique, 1999), or factor models that identify loadings, factor returns, and the price of risk, λ (see Ang et al 2006).

Yet size and value investing became popular. Dimensional Fund Advisers created a highly successful and influential quant shop, and size and value became ubiquitous as either fund signatures or risk factors, depending on the application. There were dark times, such as when the size factor faltered in the late 80s and mid-90s, or when value stocks got clobbered in the tech bubble, but they always came back: they were risky! The rigorous methodology of latent factors models, Kalman filters, and GMM, meanwhile, produced nothing practical in finance.

Simple models win in the long run, but the short run is always dominated by the obfuscators. Socrates and Jesus criticized the sophists and Pharisees, respectively, because these official intellectuals were sanctimonious hair-splitters, and missed the forest for the trees. Christian apologists were the foremost Medieval scholars, and though now apologist is a derogatory term for a dogmatic thinker, the key is that sophisticated reasoning has always been used to mask dogmatic thinking. Sophisticates use their superior knowledge to out-argue, not find the truth. Complex arguments that are long and hard to follow, and have the support of the most other intellectuals are impossible to rebut. No one is going to spend a lot of time understanding such arguments if they think it's all a waste of time, so everyone who could argue with them was a fellow-believer (eg, I originally wanted to be a macroeconomist, but quickly discerned it was pointless and so today I cannot give a thorough critique of dominant macro models).

Simple models are better at finding the truth because they are easier for others to replicate and test, and this is the best evidence of something that is true and important, because things that work tend to be copied over time. They also expose dopey reasoning and overfitting, because readers can understand them. Complexity does not overcome overfitting, it just hides it better. GMM estimators are rarely criticized for overfitting because it's too hard to tell, and when no one is getting caught for the world's oldest statistical sin you can be sure it is rampant (eg, when the UFC had a steroid problem no one was getting caught).

More importantly, there just are not that many really profound financial ideas one would call complex. Off the top of my head, I think about how volatility is proportional to the square root of time, Black-Scholes, or the convexity adjustment in forwards vs. futures for interest-rates. Yet, these can all be communicated in one sitting to a person who understands basic statistics. That's not true for the fancy methods above.

While the Fama-French approach thrived due to its simplicity, we are now in another dark time. Specifically, the 5-factor model introduced by Fama-French in 2015 has reported the following  monthly return averages for their factors (excluding the uncontroversial market risk premium):


Since publication, however, the results look like this (note: they should be positive):



Unlike prior dark times, we now also have a boatload of factors in addition to Fama and French's 5.  Overfitting is a perennial problem. Unlike 'big data' used by Amazon and Netflix, factor data is orders of magnitude smaller and grows very slowly, all the while many thousands of full-time researchers are looking at the same data for new patterns. They are all highly motivated to find new, better factors, and we all know what happens when you torture the data long enough. The simplicity of the 3-factor Fama-French model was not an equilibrium, as this invited many to ignore some factors and create their own (even Fama and French joined in, adding 2 more). There is now just as much tendentious and disingenuous reasoning among the factor promoters as there was with those old opaque and complex methods, we have just gotten used to it.

This especially goes for equity factors applied at hedge funds, which number at least 20 and include orthogonally estimated style factors but also industry factors that no one thinks have a return premium. Argument by authority is ubiquitous among authorities of all stripes, only among scientists, this tactic is masked by having multiple subtle assumptions justified by references to various well-cited peer-reviewed articles, each of which itself does the same thing, making it impossible to refute because no one has that much time. I have never seen a good argument for how these factors help manage risk, but I understand how they are very useful in explaining why returns were down last month. Pretentious and parochial jargon makes it easier for the common (ie, dumb) risk manager, senior executive, fund advisor, etc., to feel valuable: they know something outsiders do not understand, and those outsiders can't prove it's not blather.

No financial researcher agrees on the canonical set of factors or how best to proxy them.  While no one is suggesting Kalman filters, everyone has some subtle twist for their value factor, how to time factors, or their own creation. Failure now has led many to reexamine their factors, worried that they either overfit their models in the past or would be doing so now by changing them. The risk of jumping off a factor just before it rebounds is symmetric to the risk of holding on to one that will join price, accruals, and inflation betas in the history dustbin.


Monday, January 20, 2020

Diversification

I was interested in calculating what the portfolio volatility would be for a portfolio given various correlation assumptions, and also the number of assets. So I took two portfolio of the S&P500 in two very different years: 2008 and 2017. The VIX had one of its highest average levels in 2008, at 31.5, while its lowest in 2017, at 11.0.  Because I'm interested in low vol portfolios, I took the stocks with below-average volatility from the prior year.  The statistics on these 250 stocks were as follows:

Lowest 250 vol stocks in S&P500

2008
2017
AvgVol
60%
19%
AvgCorr
0.48
0.14

Both total volatility and correlation were about 3 times higher in the crisis year of 2008. This is because the total market volatility was so much higher. One could say correlations rise in bad times, but one could also say that mathematically, given a 'one-factor' model (the market), if the market has higher volatility its assets will have a higher correlation.

The equation I presented last week calculates portfolio volatility as follows:
  • Volatility (n assets, correlation c)=sqrt(avgVol^2/n + (n-1)/n*c*avgVol^2)
Here c is the average correlation, so the average of the correlation matrix off the diagonal. Volatility and correlation are taken from the same period here, that in the years 2008 and 2017.

In the equation, most of this diversification benefit happens rather quickly, with 90% of it coming after n=15. Given many people look at multiple factors, not just the market factor, this could make this formula less relevant. So I took all those 250 stocks and created thousands random of sub-portfolios to get an estimate of the actual, or empirical, volatility. 

Comparing this to the formula generated the data in the above chart: they are basically identical. You only see two lines because there are two sets of lines that overlap. In both scenarios, the 10 asset portfolio had insignificantly higher volatility than the 250 asset portfolio. While the correlations are quite different, generating different levels of diversification as a function of the number of assets, they both almost perfectly matched the simple formula.  

Bottom line: 10 assets really is enough.  


Wednesday, January 15, 2020

Helmut Schoeck's Envy

Helmut Schoeck published Envy in 1966. It remains one of the few systematic treatises on the subject and highlights a profound aspect of human nature. Envy is of keen interest to me because ever since I wrote my dissertation on the low volatility effect back in 1994, I have been interested in why. In standard economic theory, individuals are assumed to maximize their utility, which is independent of other's wealth. With this assumption, you get a risk premium, and it should be ubiquitous. The risk premium is actually quite rare, limited to a couple of asset classes (though not within them). For more on envy in economics, see here.

Envy is eternal and ubiquitous, but also taboo. This is because envy is one of those few vices that is neither an excess or deficit of virtue, in that cowardice and recklessness are a deficit and excess of the virtue courage. The literature defending the rationality and value of emotions usually excludes envy as irredeemable.

Thus, no one candidly admits to being envious. We really do not even have a word for sincerely saying, 'I envy John,' in that one can only say this in a way that implies a benign, emulative, or admiring variety of envy, rather than the invidious form.  We do not even like to analyze it very deeply.  For example, Schoeck notes that Herman Melville's Billy Budd is about a good man who arouses the envy of the ship's master-at-arms, motivating many spiteful actions. The book's theme is clearly about envy, yet of the many written analyses of the novel they rarely mention envy, and never focus upon it, but rather highlight evil or injustice

Ordinary language tends to conflate envy and jealousy, yet they are distinct emotions. A man can be jealous of another man because of their mutual affection for a woman, and here the rival is fungible and the beloved is not fungible. In envy, it is the other way around, resenting a rival, not because of a specific woman, but rather, that he can obtain a woman of that type.

Most observers of envy, from Aristotle on, have noted it is felt toward those with whom the subject perceives himself as in competition. We only feel envious of our peers, or who we consider being our peers. Thus, we do not envy a world-class athlete, in that we know we are simply not in that class of people. In medieval times you had peasants, knights, lords, and a king, while in Ancient Greece you had slaves, freedmen, metics, and the upper class. Envy was restricted to one's class and perhaps those in the class above.

Essence of envy

Schoeck presents some theories for the origin of envy, not all convincing. First, from our competition for parental resources. As the runt of the litter gets fewer parental resources, or the weak bird is left to naked fratricide in the presence of the mother, all children wish to dominate their parent's attention out of self-preservation. Yet this is the definition of jealousy, in that the instinct presupposes a non-fungible desired object: parental attention. Another cause mentioned is in keeping society well-functioning. In his view, without envy, people with power would be haughty and overbearing. Yet, simple reciprocal altruism would seem to be at play, in that a successful alpha baboon realizes that if they are too overbearing, their underlings can and will kill him (see Frans de Waal).

Another interesting cause of envy is the ignorance of chance. The most envy-ridden tribes do not possess a concept of luck. Everything is determined by spirits, fortune, or the 'evil eye.' In primitive societies, the success of others is equated with the betrayal of the tribe, because it could have only have occurred by leveraging evil spirits or stealing from others. A certain degree of rationality, or at least a freedom from a magical view of things, is required before the envious man can fully realize that the man he envies does not possess something which, but for the possessor's existence, he, the envious man, might otherwise have.

I see envy as the result of our base, animalistic, status-seeking human nature. When we focus on life on this Earth, we want status, and what that implies, justification. Only a high status can prove, to ourselves and others, that we are good, important, and admired. Status, alas, is in fixed supply. While this constraint can be ameliorated by the concept of having many status silos--football, math, Fortnight--ultimately there are a limited number of positional goods: lakefront property, the 'best' cars or vacations, and most importantly, attractive mates.

Note that our greatest suffering is not caused by physical pain or privation, but rather when the will of another inflicts it. This is because random accidents do not reflect on us as individuals, as they happen by chance to everyone. But suffering caused by another implies inferiority, in that the tormentor had the ability to force their will against ours. Our status is diminished when a malefactor successfully torments us, as it highlights our impotence, and thus, lack of status.

Utopia and Envy

The completely just society where envy is absent is doomed because it is based on the false premise that once there is justice, there will be nothing left for anyone to envy. This situation can never occur because man inevitably discovers something new to envy. Further, by raising envy to the status of virtue (as righteous resentment over injustice), political entrepreneurs are motivated to reveal new inequalities that are to blame for people's impotence. Thus we now have the virtue of intersectionalism, where a transgendered black man is more righteous than a cis-black straight man.

There are so many ways to align individuals at some point we realize the ultimate minority is the individual. Yet, when envy is elevated it inverts all values that compete, resulting in the de-individualization of individuals in the name of equality. Simple utilitarianism implies that justice for many is more important than for any one person, and so what counts are the superficial categories we consider 'diverse.' The individual is unimportant.

Most utopias presume that reducing inequality will eradicate envy, though in fact, the opposite is more certain. Utopias are places where people are so equal that they will only have less than others by conscious choice, the way I have less strawberry ice cream than my neighbor because I prefer chocolate. A sad fact of life is that equality of opportunity comes to grief because individuals do not all have the same ability to make use of their opportunities with comparable success. This is a more bitter experience than one for which one can blame others rather than one's self.

The most egalitarian societies, hunter-gatherer societies, actually have more envy that less egalitarian ones. This isn't obvious because their lack of wealth seems to imply they are not greedy, and thus, selfish like Westerners, but this is just wishful naïve thinking. There is no tribe where social harmony prevails because each man has as little as the next. For primitive egalitarian societies, envy is both a cause and an effect. Schoeck notes that such communities tend to have no conception of luck, and so see any objective relative prosperity as a sign of theft or alignment with evil forces. Schoeck discusses Native American, African, and Polynesian tribes, and note the strong social pressure for anyone better off to be lavish in hospitality and generous with gifts. He knows that if he fails in this, 'the voice of envy will speak out in the whispers of witchcraft' which would make his life very unpleasant.

Envy prevents people from accumulating the wealth needed to create technology, and thus the free time needed to create art, science, literature, and philosophy. A lack of differentiation makes more apparent one's inadequacies, in that some will be more clever, athletic, or brave. When people are made equal in endowments, the only reason for not attaining a higher status is within us, our character, our essence.

In earlier times, the upper classes were different in many objective ways. An elite's risk of starvation was insignificant compared to the peasant, reflected in the fact that they were 10 centimeters taller than a commoner in 18th century England; they could read, sometimes in foreign languages, which implied a great deal of useful education. Today those barriers are gone. Almost everyone knows how to read and write, the basics of mathematics and history, the poor are fatter than the rich, and height disparities between individuals of the same race are absent.

 Equality Increases Envy

Our unprecedented wealth and comfort should have led to less envy, in that we all have access to the knowledge that brings self-actualization and self-esteem, but instead, it has lead to greater envy. The poorly paid op-ed writer of your local newspaper considers themselves not just equal to the rich, but better informed and more articulate, as proven by their many eloquent and insightful essays. Their lack of status motivates envy because they feel just as worthy, as competent, as those who are doing better. David Brooks highlighted this in his book Bobos in Paradise.

Consider our very best intellectuals. One might think they have acquired wisdom, and so a sense of self-actualization and self-esteem. Yet professors in the social sciences are an unhappy lot, reflected in Sayre's law: 'academic politics is the most vicious and bitter form of politics, because the stakes are so low.' This is because only those at the top of each specialty have the power to confer prestige and honor on favored individuals, subjects, and style of discourse. They influence taste, favor certain methodologies, and define the boundaries of their disciplines. To be chief consecrator is the intellectual’s dream, and it only can be apportioned to a few.

The idea that men are intrinsically equal in every admirable trait, combined with the idea that all we need is nourishment, warmth, and education, is simply wrong. Sure, to be engaged in a desperate struggle for food and shelter is to be wholly free from a sense of futility, but such environments are rare for anyone reading this blog. The desire for praise is more imperative than the desire for food and shelter. Praise from the praiseworthy is beyond all rewards, why we are more hurt by the lukewarm approval of men we respect than the contempt of fools.

Social justice justifies not having many things so that others may not have them either. In the politics of envy, all that is needed is to promise the envious the destruction or the confiscation of assets enjoyed by others; behind that, there is no need to promise anything constructive. Thus it really does not matter how the government spends punitive taxation. As shown in primitive societies, when creative ambition is punished, you get stasis, not just in economic productivity, but everything else: art, literature, science.

Resentment is held to be a potentially morally justifiable emotion, whereas envy former is not.  Resentment may come from real injustice, such as slavery. Yet good reasons for resentment are few, edge cases, while much resentment comes from a desire to blame others for our inadequacies. A passionate obsession with inequality is an attempt to compensate for a lack of meaning in one's own life, and you can never get enough of what you don't need to make you happy.

It is easy to lie to ourselves about our motivations, creating a bad equilibrium, as poor hunter-gatherer societies show. These are not idyllic communes free of self-interest, but rather, ignorant and envious cultures. Social flourishing is most fruitful when envious considerations unencumber man's creative faculties. Envy is something that should be discouraged. Pride is a sense of worth derived from the perceived appreciation of others, while self-esteem derives from the belief that we are profoundly appreciated, as a unique individual, by those we profoundly appreciate. Note that such a feeling comes out of a relationship of individuals, not some aggregate metric of status.

While there is nothing wrong with having wealth or wanting more, this should be of secondary importance, and wisdom is all about priorities. We should be encouraged to appreciate excellence in others to build excellence in ourselves. This takes faith, in that we have to believe our excellence in character, even if not reflected in the current status hierarchy, is appreciated by someone we admire, if not now, then in the future.

Sunday, June 02, 2019

Median Anonymous Crypto Exchange Costs 1.5%, Sometimes 100%

Gemini's Order GUI
Many of the big exchanges like Gemini or Coinbase do not have lots of alt-coins, and if you don't have an account the process of creating one can take days if not weeks. They also can make it hard to place orders, as Gemini's default trade mode is incredibly infantile. Further, these exchanges put up significant hurdles for market makers, and the only thing that prevents collusive tactics is free entry. Regulators are happy to prevent competition if they can make sure they have control over who gets to trade what.  Nonetheless, when you can trade directly the markets are pretty tight for small size, under 0.1% bid-ask spread for trading 1 bitcoin.

Coin shifters can be used anonymously and instantly for most traded crypto coins, which is very convenient. Thus I did not include ShapeShift, which regrettably, though understandably, yielded to regulatory authorities last year and requires a full KYC (regulators gave them no choice).

I sent bitcoin amounts of between 0.3 and 1.0. The costs were around 1.5% for the major shifters. While CoinSwitch does seem significantly better, around 1.05%, there was some significant variability, so this could just be sampling error around an equilibrium cost of 1.5%. Either way, you should expect to pay--all in--much more than the 0.5% often advertised. This really isn't so bad, because Gemini charges 1%, and it would be nice if one of these shifters actually said that their total cost is 1.5%, because it would signal honesty.

Cost of Trading BTC to ETH
BTC amounts 0.3 to 1.0. Cost here is defined as the difference between the market price at the time I sent coins and the implied price from the actual number of coins I received.

CoinShifter count Hours Cost stdev
CoinSwitch 4 1.5 1.05% 0.40%
Changelly 5 1.1 1.39% 0.17%
MorphToken 4 2.3 1.47% 0.05%
Flyp.me 2 0.7 2.22% 0.29%
n.exchange1 inf 100%

Transactions take about 1-2 hours and depends on blockchain traffic as expected.

Flyp.me was quick, but they cost significantly more than alternatives, and they only allowed up to 0.3 bitcoin per transaction.

Many post explicit fees, usually around 0.5%, but these are really a distraction because most of the money brokers make is not explicit. This often confuses people, as when E-Trade or some other broker tells customers they pay only 10$ a trade (or even zero) because most of the cost of trading is in the bid-ask spread. A broker either has specialists making markets off of their customer flow or has sold their flow to specialists making markets. In equity markets, while I was trading at a large hedge fund and analyzed over a billion USD in trades, I found the explicit fees were about 1/4 the cost of trading on small orders (those without market impact, ie, about the size of the top-of-the-book size).

The only way to see how much an exchange charges is to compare the average execution price to the market price at the time of the order, as this combines the explicit and implicit fees. Once you send a coin to a coin shifter and it appears on the blockchain, the shifter can be confident it is getting that coin because the size of these orders is usually below 2 BTC, which is too small to be worth engineering a malicious double-spend. Thus, at that time the shifter can then make the offsetting market trade certain they are hedged, and so that is the time I use to benchmark my fills.

n.exchange was the only one to simply keep my bitcoin. N.exchange has acknowledged my trade, and I have checked in every couple of days to inquire about its status, and they keep telling me the servers are undergoing maintenance. It's been over two weeks [1 year!], and there's no message on their main page about this issue.

n.exchange highlights the importance of trust on the blockchain. Though anonymity is an important crypto principle, reputation is still important. It is costly to learn whether someone is trustworthy, as invariably trades on the blockchain are not done via secure atomic swaps, but rather, you send bitcoin (etc), and hope they send something back. The process of learning if they are scammers takes a lot of time, and occasionally you lose all your money.

Tuesday, April 30, 2019

Convexity Explains the High BitMEX ETH Funding Rate

BitMEX offers swaps that make it easy to lever a long or short bitcoin (BTC) and ether (ETH). The main reason it trades so much is that they are based outside of US or EU control in the little archipelago-nation of Seychelles, and also that it transacts only in Bitcoin. This combination makes it difficult for regulators to attack.

Their swap contracts are like futures contracts without expiry dates. A futures market trades off of a futures price, which is different than the spot price and its difference from the spot price is called the basis, where basis=spot - futures. The basis can be quite large in markets that are difficult to arbitrage, as sometimes the futures/forward prices are quite different than spot markets, and this difference can be explained as a risk premium, though this is just a catch-all term for anything outside of simple interest rates. A swap trading off of a spot price captures this basis via differential funding rates for the long and short. Thus, if the spot rate is $100 and the futures price in 1 month is $110, in a swap this would show up as a 10% monthly funding rate paid by the long to the short, which is implicitly what occurs in the futures market as a contract rolls towards expiration.

At BitMEX they call the basis the Funding Rate, and it is applied every 8 hours. Below are the annualized funding rates, by month, for the BTC and ETH swaps.


These rates imply that if you moved your BTC position into a long BTC swap at BitMEX, you would have added an extra 15% (annualized) to your return with little effort. Even better, the +45% ETH funding rate seems to imply arbitrage, wherein you could have hedged a long ETH position with a short position in the ETH swap, locking in a fat 45% annualized return while avoiding that entire Aug-present ETH price decline.

I asked people in Reddit their best explanation, and the answers were related to sentiment or simply a market imbalance. Yet there's a futures contract for the ETHBTC contract, and the basis there is quite small, about 5% annualized, which is inconsistent with this explanation. Further, ETH and BTC are highly correlated, about 90% using 2019 data, so it is implausible to think these two assets would have such radically different risk premia.

The trick is to adjust the funding rate for the BTC~ETH covariance in order to capture the convexity of USD returns. With this adjustment, the swap funding rates are about the same. This reminds me of the convexity adjustment in eurodollar futures is needed to compare eurodollar rates to interest rate swap rates due to the fact that eurodollar futures are settled daily while an interest rate swap is settled only at expiration. The convexity adjustment became well-publicized in the mid-90s, but for a good 5 years traders were oblivious, and while there was sufficient liquidity they did not make this convexity adjustment, generating arbitrage profits for a couple of savvy banks (you needed direct access to libor rates, so as an individual you could not arb this). In contrast, here it seems markets have always priced for this while it is still not widely understood or documented.

BTC Swap Payoff

Let us ignore the funding rate and look just at the profit generated by the asset price for a BTCUSD swap.  At BitMEX, the long profit is generated in BTC as follows for an entry price at time t, and  exit at t+1:

  • BTCswap Profit (in BTC)=Notional*[1/BTC(t) - 1/BTC(t+1)]
Note the seemingly backward ordering of the prices. This is because the BTC notional amount is in USD, and as we have a USD position, we have to ultimately translate that back into BTC.  Thus if you are long $1000 in the BTC swap, your USD profit would be

  • BTCswap profit (in USD)=$1000*[BTC(t+1)/BTC(t)-1]
As you are getting paid in BTC, however, you need to make the final adjustment of this into BTC, so you add this final price to payoff function:

  • BTCswap profit (in BTC)=$1000*[BTC(t+1)/BTC(t)-1]/BTC(t+1)
Applying some algebra gives the BitMEX payoff function:

  • BTCswap  profit (in BTC)=$1000*[1/BTC(t)-1/BTC(t+1)]
Thus, the BTC swap formula replicates the intuitive sense in which your notional amount is invested in BTC. The PNL is nonlinear in BTC, but linear in USD, as shown below:



ETH Swap Payoff

In contrast, the BitMEX ETH swap uses a different formula that BitMEX CEO Arthur Hayes notes is "attractive to speculators who wish to have exposure to a foreign asset, but without the corresponding exchange risk." This makes little sense because most investors care about their return in fiat, not BTC, and it is inconsistent with BitMEX's BTC swap, which generates a linear return in fiat currency. Most importantly, if you are trading on an asset's USD price the notional should be in USD; if the asset price is in BTC the notional should be in BTC. In this contract, the BitMEX ETH notional is basically in BTC but the asset price is in USD. The ETH perpetual swap is based on a profound misunderstanding of how a Quanto works.

The BitMEX ETH swap is a position defined by the number of contracts times a multiplier (1E-6). This is then multiplied by the difference in ETH's USD price to generate the position payoff. Abstracting from the funding rate, the payoff function for the ETH perpetual swap is:
  • ETHswap payoff (in BTC)=0.000001*#Contracts*[ETH(t+1) - ETH(t)]
To see what this implies, it is best to simply take the payoff function and turn it into USD by multiplying it by the USD BTC price at completion:
  • ETHswap payoff (in USD)=0.000001*#Contracts*[ETH(t+1) - ETH(t)]*BTC(t+1)
Given the ETH and BTC returns are about 90% correlated, this then generates the opposite return pattern to the BTC swap, where the USD return is convex, while the BTC return is linear. For example, if the ETH price rises 10% the BTC price will also probably rise, increasing returns for up movements. The same process works on downward movements to dampen losses. The result is the opposite of the BTC swap, a convex payoff in USD and a linear payoff in BTC.


The USD return can be derived by looking at the initial USD investment, which is the following at time t:
  • ETHswap USD investment=BTC(t)*0.000001*#Contracts*ETH(t)
As return=payoff/investment, the USD return on this ETH position is thus
  • ETHswap USD % return=BTC(t+1)/BTC(t)*[ETH(t+1) /ETH(t)-1]
or 
  • ETHswap USD return=[1+ret(B)]*ret(E)
where ret(B) and ret(E) are the net returns for bitcoin and ether. The expected value of this is 

  • E{ETHswap USD return}=ret(E)+covariance(ret(E),ret(B))
as the covariance(a,b)=correl(a,b)*[stdev(a)*stdev(b)], this covariance term generates a boost to the USD payoff due to the significant ETH~BTC correlation. You can see why it is needed by looking at the convexity in the USD returns, an example of Jensen's inequality. Since June 2017, the volatility for BTC and ETH has been 90% and 118% respectively, with a correlation of 60%, generating a covariance adjustment term annualizes out to be about 64%. This is the return premium of the ETH swap compared to the ETH USD return over that period: 51% vs. 115% (all data reflecting arithmetically annualized returns). Thus if the average ETH return is boosted by 60% via the covariance adjustment, the 45% funding rate implies a comparable -15% funding rate for ETH, just as in the BTC. You can download an Excel sheet showing the math and data here.

A 15% return premium for going long at BitMEX is high, but not insanely so, and not without risk. The rate bounces around, and BitMEX could be hacked or shut down by regulators at any time, so I think the 15% funding credit longs get is fairly priced.

There are two qualifications. First, it neglects the fact you need to buy bitcoin to enter into them, and so you are essentially long the notional amount of bitcoin as well. Secondly, given a total return is essentially a geometric return, while an arithmetic return maintains a constant USD notional each period, one has to rebalance their position each period to generate the arithmetic return, so investors would need to adopt such an approach to generate the arithmetic return (see here for difference).

Conclusion

The BitMEX formula is poorly conceived: the swap has a BTC notional and references a USD price creating a convex USD payoff. Investors are forced to not only take a position on the future move in ETH, but also the ETH~BTC covariance. I understand why it is so popular, as it is very difficult to put on such a position hassle-free anywhere else, yet BitMEX should offer something with a linear fiat payoff like their BTC swap, as I think this would be even more popular. This could be done by having the BTC notional contract trade on the BTCETH price; alternatively, they could add a BTC return adjustment to make the USD return linear. Either approach would remove the importance of estimating the covariance term, which is a distraction for most investors, and also one that few really understand.

Wednesday, March 13, 2019

Antifragility is just Hormesis (to the extent it works)

In Nassim Taleb’ book Antifragile he emphasizes that ‘if you see a fraud and do not say fraud, you are a fraud,’ I am thus compelled to note that Antifragile is a fraud because its theme is based on intentional misdirection. The most conspicuous and popular examples he presents are also explicitly mentioned as not the essence of antifragility. Indeed, incoherence is Taleb’s explicit strategy, as the Wikipedia entry on Antifragility notes Taleb presents his book in a way to make it difficult to criticize.

I bring this up because last month I was listening to a Joe Rogan podcast where they mentioned hormesis, the concept that small amounts of a toxin or stressor strengthen an organism. The guest noted hormesis was discovered in the 1950s when researchers noticed a little bit of herbicide paradoxically makes plants stronger. Actually, this phenomenon was found back in 1888 concerning yeast, though the basic idea is probably timeless in that everyone understands exercise strengthens muscles while immobilizing a limb after an injury leads to atrophy. A glass of wine a day is a tonic, though too much leads to cirrhosis. The term Mithridatism comes from King Mithridates (160 BC) self-administering small amounts of a toxin to build up his immunity, so this is a very old idea. 

I tweeted that Taleb thinks he invented hormesis, whereupon Taleb quickly noted that antifragility is not hormesis, and Antifragile explicitly mentions hormesis and its 1888 discovery, as well as Mithridatism. A snippet of his Twitter rebuttal is here. Tweets are not the place for snarky subtlety. My point was that far as antifragility works, it's hormesis, in spite of Taleb's qualification that "hormesis is a metaphor" for antifragility. This got me wondering how such a contradiction happened.

Taleb states his neologism antifragility is "beyond resilience or robustness." He defines antifragility more precisely as "a convex response to a stressor or source of harm, leading to a positive sensitivity to increase in volatility." Thus hormesis is not an example of antifragility, because, in the parlance of finance, hormesis is like having a positive but modest beta, while antifragility is increasing the value of a portfolio by increasing its gamma. Gamma is a measure of convexity, the signature feature of a put or call option, and in uncertain environments, a higher gamma leads to a higher value.

The common takeaway of Antifragile, however, is simple resilience. For example, in Jonathan Haidt's book the Coddling of the American Mind he credits Taleb’s concept of antifragility for arguing that protecting students from ideas they find offensive leads to them becoming more fragile, anxious, and easily discouraged. Actively confronting ideas we don't like makes us tougher and smarter, or as JS Mill wrote, ‘he who knows only his own side of the case knows little of that.’ Haidt's book mentions unstructured play for children, the immune system, and exposure to peanuts as examples of Taleb's concept of antifragility. Wikipedia’s entry on antifragile gives as its primary example that of bone density being strengthened by exposure to stress. These are all examples of hormesis.

Convex Payoff
If you own an option you have positive convexity and benefit from higher volatility; you are long volatility (aka long vega). It has long been known that financial options, especially out-of-the-money put and call options, have poor average returns. A good example is provided by VXX ETF, which is long vega and loses money with about the same Sharpe ratio as the SP500 index. Being long vega is like shorting the market, good in bad times, but in the long run a bad investment.

Thales
Taleb is aware of this and states that good antifragile things are not financial options because they "are sold by someone," but rather real options, which he thinks are free: "we don't pay for options given to us by nature and technical innovation." His prominent example here is Thales of Miletus. Aristotle gave us the story that Thales secured the rights to wine presses at a relatively low rate, which is an option: he had the right, not the obligation to use the wine presses. When the harvest proved to be bountiful, and so the demand for the presses was high, Thales charged a high price for their use and reaped a considerable profit. Taleb states the key to Thales's fortune was his awareness of his 'lack of knowledge,' in that as he owned an option he enabled himself to benefit from uncertainty.

I do not have data on wine presses circa 600 BC, but currently, such options are generally over-priced. For example, in futures markets, there is a thing called the basis, the difference between the future and cash price of a good reflecting the yield on the asset vs. the opportunity cost of money (ie, the interest rate). One of the components of that basis is the convenience yield, in that if there is a shortage, having the actual commodity will have a great value. For goods subject to shortages (eg, wine presses), this increases the cash price over the future price because having the good on hand can be very valuable in a crisis. William Easterly has argued that Western countries dumping grain on African countries during shortages deprives farmers of essential farmer revenue that comes from crises; often this profit pays for breaking even during normal times, so removing it discourages endogenous markets. Spikes in demand are a large part of any asset owner's income, statistically anticipated and priced into well-functioning markets. Simple awareness of a 'lack of knowledge' about future demand is not helpful, because it presumes the seller assumes the convenience yield or option value is zero. It may have worked in 600 BC, but markets have removed that inefficiency. 

Taleb gives other examples, for instance: avoiding doctors, having different alternatives on vacation or for dinner, the ability to switch jobs, a rent-controlled apartment, or being married to an accountant but an occasional fling with a rock star. To the extent these options are desirable, they are not underpriced, and certainly not free. People realize this, which is why they are rarely mentioned as examples of antifragility by Taleb's many supporters. The bottom line is that things with convexity are too costly in general because people love lottery tickets; convexity is not the essence of any antifragile example because they are generally not good investments (antifragility is supposedly a good investment or strategy). 

Another misleading application is in biology or economics, where populations or markets that have had to withstand more competition and external variability dominate those with benign environments. A bacteria population in the lab loses its ability to withstand stressors, an industry protected from new entrants loses its ability to compete when technology changes the game, or an industry protected against failure becomes bloated and less robust. Systems that allow or even encourage failure thrive relative to those that protect its members from failure. In economics, the basic idea of exiting losing businesses is perhaps the most crucial advantage of the free market over socialism. Failure strengthens the herd, whether animals or firms. 

Taleb states that his notion of antifragility is behind the following: "evolution, culture, ideas, revolutions, political systems, technological innovation, cultural and economic success, corporate survival, good recipes, the rise of cities, cultures, legal systems, equatorial forests, bacterial resistance." Success within these domains comes from looking at the competitive success of groups benefiting from hormesis vs. those insulated from it. Competition leads to the resiliency and efficiency needed to survive.

Back to his definition of antifragile, it is not that the prospering agents are convex to stress, rather that as survivors their progeny takes over the extinct's lebensraum; the dynamic effect of robustness in a system based on survival of the fittest looks like convexity.  Indeed, Taleb notes the property applies to the group, not the individuals: "the surviving cohort is stronger than the initial one—but not quite the individuals since the weaker ones died." So here, like with hormesis, he notes it is a metaphor, not a precise analogy. He is quite aware that such systems are not direct examples of antifragility because the agents that generate convexity at the higher level are merely robust, via hormesis, and their germline exhibits convexity. 

A robust business has to innovate because every business model changes over time. Jeff Bezos notes success takes someone with a stubborn vision yet flexible on details, because without a strong vision one's strategy overreacts to current failure or success, while without flexibility one cannot adapt when things do not work precisely as planned, as they always do. Note here we see a classic example of 'moderation in all things,' where the optimum lies between an excess and deficit.  In contrast, Taleb describes a caricature of vision via his "teleological fallacy" which is the "illusion that you know exactly where you are going." One could go on all day about the inadequacies of strawmen, as Taleb does.

An industry protected from failure or change via union work rules or bailouts removes the micro-instability needed at all levels of a company to develop innovation, robustness, and a healthy familiarity with failure. While some rules and regulations are good, most are merely a pretext for barriers to entry protecting current workers and firms. This is just an argument for allowing stress, and the resulting failures it implies; that is, for hormesis to do its thing.

Becoming excellent first requires a lot of domain-specific hard work, with a focus that enlarges some things while excluding others. Jordan Peterson argues that flow comes from operating at the edge of our competence, with enough mastery to generate satisfaction yet enough novelty to be challenging. To an outsider, such explorations can seem like random tinkering, but for an expert, it is a variation on their unusual intuition. Suggesting that the general strategy of accumulating convex exposures is the key to success is a profound error, as in the difference between the benefit of anger, and anger directed at the right person at the right time and in the right way.

An essential attribute of someone who innovates is their ability to embrace failure. Adversity is a great teacher, why mother giraffes knock their newborns down just after first learning how to stand;  they have to learn quickly on the African grasslands. Embracing failure is easy to say but hard to do, which Taleb acknowledges. Actually, he doesn't explicitly acknowledge this, but as he never mentions why he worked for several banks while he was a trader (blow up?) or the fact that every close friend he mentions in Antifragile is highly successful, suggests he sees failure as a characteristic of unremarkable losers.

Failure will always be costly, and due to moral hazard, no one will sell you a put option on your failures (you would fail on purpose to cash in on your put option).  In addition to acclimating ourselves to failure, just as useful are the Christian virtues of faith, hope, and love. If you have faith in what you hope for regardless of your economic success and love someone who loves you for who you are, failures under the sun are not so terrible. This allows you to explore more virgin territory so that when the unexpected happens, you might be in the right place at the right time.

There are two ways to generate an option payoff. One is to buy an option; another is via dynamic replication, which involves doubling down a position as it becomes more in-the-money. The outsized success of winners over losers in dynamic systems generates large convexities, but to be a winner, the keys are not buying options, but rather, via resilience acquired through hormesis, surviving long enough to achieve success indirectly via a combination of vision, excellence, and flexibility (obliquity). To describe the essence of this as creating option payoffs focuses people on explicit optionality, as opposed to the optionality that comes via hormesis. Resilience generates outsized winners in dynamic zero-sum competition over time as the survivors take over. This is why everyone mentions examples of hormesis, waves their hands, and hopes no one notices the bait-and-switch.

Promoting the new idea that acquiring options on the next Black Swan is the basis of "our own existence as a species on this planet" is the sort of hyperbole you hear at TED talks. It is the sort of thing bureaucrats love because they are generally too high up to have much domain-specific expertise, and the incoherent but plausible-sounding theme allows one to talk about strategy without actually knowing anything specific. Then you give examples of your great idea that are really something else entirely, and fade to black...






Sunday, July 22, 2018

Robeco's Concise Financial History of Europe

If you like finance and history, you'll love Robeco's "A Concise Financial History of Europe," written by Jan Sytze Mosselaar. A lot of financial firms provide books to clients, and I bet if you visit Robeco in Rotterdam they'll give you one for your plane ride home, which is more than enough time to read it (100 pages, lots of pictures).

It starts with Fibonacci introducing the Arabic number system in 1202, but interestingly the Florentine bankers prevented anything but Roman numerals as late as 1299, and the Medici's didn't adopt Arabic numerals until 1500.

The Florentine bankers Bardi, Peruzzi, and Acciaiuoli, who prospered from 1300 to 1340, left a lot of documentation about their business. The Medicis then dominated from 1397–1494, followed by the Fuggers, and then the Rothschilds from 1800-1900. Interestingly, the Rothschild patriarch created the perfect family business, putting his five sons in key cities throughout Europe, allowing them to arbitrage the different exchange rates common to markets that are not fully integrated.

Last year Bitcoin often traded at prices 5% higher in Korea, but it is difficult to move money in and out of Korea due to explicit laws. The only way to arb this requires a non-formal relationship with someone in Korea, like a brother. You then buy in the US while your brother sells there, settling when you meet for a holiday. That is, only an informal but trusted partnership can arbitrage geographic price disparities caused by legal restrictions because there are no explicit asset and liabilities, just an implicit agreement within a family.

Jan notes the rise of finance from Northern Italy, to Bruges, then Antwerp (1500-1550), and then Amsterdam. As the Dutch East India company was the first traded stock (1602) and prospered throughout the 17th century, Amsterdam was well situated. Amsterdam also reduced the uncertainty caused by the many coins and their various levels of debasement by requiring every transaction above 600 guilders to go through the Bank of Amsterdam, which kept a 100% reserve ratio and cleaned up the system by melting down 'bad' coins.

The English are fond of deprecating the Dutch--Dutch Uncle, courage, date--but they really owe the Dutch quite a bit. The financial center of Amsterdam literally moved to London around 1680, as when Dutch stadtholder William of Orange took over England via the Glorious Revolution in 1688, it gave them not only a Bill of Rights that limited monarchical power, it also created the Bank of England, tradable bonds, and an active London stock market. The start of the Industrial Revolution is often dated around 1750 centered in London, and surely it would have taken a lot longer without those innovations.

There was a simple way to get around the Catholic prohibition on interest. The 14th-century Florentine bankers simply used different FX rates on contracts. As FX rates could fluctuate the bill was not considered a loan and so not usury. Explicit loans were also available, but they would have been more like 'payday' lending today, a business dominated by two outsider groups: Jews who could charge interest to non-Jews, and pawnbrokers nicknamed Lombards, whose name underlies the 'Lombard Streets' found in many financial districts.

Jan mentions several market crashes I had never heard of. The crash of 1340 was perhaps the first international financial crisis, affected by the English default at the outbreak of the 100 years war. An IPO bubble crashed in 1696, destroying 70% of the 140 companies traded in London. Then there's 1720, where the Mississippi Company saw its share price rise 20-fold only to end worthless, and in that year only 4 of the 190 new companies survived. The massive destruction in these early stock markets gives me hope in that I suspect that at least 70% of the new bitcoins and tokens are worthless, but as these prior crashes show, that level of worthlessness does not imply the worthlessness of the blockchains in general. Other crashes mentioned occurred in 1763, 1772, and 1825.

If you ever go to a Robeco presentation, be sure to hit them up for this book.